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**TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS – ARE ALLIANCES A
FUNCTION OF AN EXTERNAL THREAT?**

By

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**TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS – ARE ALLIANCES A FUNCTION OF AN
EXTERNAL THREAT?**

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ABSTRACT

Current European-U.S. transatlantic relations represent the heritage of a large number of international alliances and institutions that were founded at a time when there was a bipolar world, a world dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union. Today fourteen years after the end of the Cold War, some national leaders question the continued viability of these international alliances and institutions. In their references to international relations, realist and liberal theorists reflect significant ideological differences, which have considerable influence on transatlantic relations. This thesis considers a central question pertaining to the future of transatlantic relations between Europe and the United States: Will the presence, or absence, of an external threat to the countries involved be the deciding factor in their willingness to cooperate in security alliances? It is a significant question, and investigating it provides a better understanding of future uses of alliances and their role in world politics. Recently, two specific historical occurrences decisively modified the security landscape worldwide: the end of the Cold War 1991 and almost two decades of violent, deadly acts of international terrorism. Since the breakdown of the Warsaw Pact 1991 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which made former satellite states suddenly independent, numerous eastern European countries have applied for membership in NATO and the European Union. At the same time, organizations such as, especially, the EU and NATO, have had to deal with the competitive and often contradictory interests of member states. This thesis will focus with emphasis on France, Germany, and United States because the differences in their positions inside NATO are most significant.

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I. TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS – ARE ALLIANCES A FUNCTION OF AN EXTERNAL THREAT?

Current European-U.S. transatlantic relations represent the heritage of a large number of international alliances and institutions that were founded at a time when there was a bipolar world, a bipolar world dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union. The worldwide confrontation of those two contrary ideological superpowers was already indicated at the end of World War II. Both superpowers were a direct result of the outcome of the war. Today, fourteen years after the end of the Cold War, some national leaders question the continued viability of these international alliances and institutions. In their references to international relations, realist and liberal theorists reflect significant ideological differences, which have considerable influence on transatlantic relations.

My thesis will consider a central question pertaining to the future of transatlantic relations between Europe and the United States: Will the presence, or absence, of an external threat to the countries involved be the deciding factor in their willingness to cooperate in security alliances? It is a significant question, and investigating it provides a better understanding of future uses of alliances and their role in world politics.

My argument focuses on alliances that were established in response to pressing security risks, not economic, environmental, or human rights issues. In subsequent Chapters, I outline the significance of the central question, outline my basic argument, and describe my theoretical methodology.

Recently, two specific historical occurrences decisively modified the security landscape worldwide: the end of the Cold War (1991) and almost two decades of violent, deadly acts of international terrorism. Since the breakdown of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which made former satellite states suddenly independent, numerous eastern European countries have applied for membership in NATO and the European Union. At the same time, organizations such as, especially, NATO and the United Nations, have had to deal with the competitive and often contradictory interests of member states.

Currently, we are witnessing fundamental changes in the environment and climate of international relations, due primarily to the obvious hegemony of the United States, economically, culturally, and militarily.

The United States seems to have one main reason for maintaining its membership in international alliances: such collective organizations provide a vehicle for the United States to exercise its predominant influence in the world. In addition, its continued membership offers the possibility that the burden and cost of maintaining worldwide order can be spread widely over many countries.

The consequent international stability is important for the maintenance of trade relations and, furthermore, to prevent the emergence of another superpower. In the Initial Draft of the Pentagon's Defense Planning Guidance it states that "we must account sufficiently for the interests of the large industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political or economic order" and "we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role."¹ Alliances permit weaker states to restrict the action of stronger states. In taking into consideration these concurring interests it is difficult to find a common solution if there is not an overall threat that forces the states to combine their interests.

In this thesis, alliances are defined in the manner proposed by John Mearsheimer: "a formal agreement or set of rules or norms that regulate behavior and outline certain obligations."² The presence of the alliances is a constant reality in the environment of international relations; however, the benefits of the alliances are difficult to quantify. Based on their principles and requirements, most alliances were initiated during the cold war era, and the present lack of an external threat similar to the Cold War Soviet-U.S. threat of nuclear war has served to reduce the inclination to consent and the level of cooperation among alliance participants.

¹ Patrick Tyler, "U.S. Strategy Plans for Insuring No Rivals Develop A One-Superpower World," *New York Times*, March 8, 1992.

² John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security*, Vol 19, No. 3, 34.

A common key assumption is that, in the near future, there will be no serious external power capable of threatening Western nations and their alliances. I argue, however, that the lack of an overarching threat makes these alliances less likely to maintain cohesion. My hypothesis is that, for any given time period, the absence or presence of a significant worldwide threat will dictate how Western alliances function. This argument is not intended to replace the ideological debate as to what role alliances can play in a bipolar world. The expectation in this investigation is that the character and the behavior of alliances over the last fifty years have shown a close relationship between threat and the capacity to act as a cohesive alliance.

If an external threat of a certain kind has solidified these alliances, then the lack of similar threat may serve to dissolve these bonds and tolerate internal differences. Such developments do not happen overnight. Just as it took time to consolidate the relations in an alliance, it will take challenges and readjustments to subjugate states autonomy in favor of institutional profit and the common good.. If alliances are shaped for mutual use and benefit and it can be shown that their behavior has no relation to the balance of power, then the argument is not valid. Furthermore, it can be predicted that the willingness of states to forego relative gains to the benefit of the alliance will decrease which can be, for example, economic aid, trade preferences, or technology exports.

External threats comprise the independent variable and are directly related to the ability of an alliance to cooperate. Western alliances had a common enemy during the Cold War that made cooperation necessary in order to maintain the balance of power. While there were high and low points of tension during this era, the overall perceived necessity for unity remained. With the lack of the Cold War enemy, the alliances are now challenged by internal threats. Without an external threat, alliances become plagued by defection and dissent over collective decisions and individual preferences. Their can cause alliances to suffer inefficacy and may lead to eventual division. In the absence of an external threat defensive realism takes over. As Kenneth N. Waltz put it, “In international politics, overwhelming power repels and leads other states to balance it.”³ In short, states will balance against a hegemonic member. After the end of the Cold War the

³ Kenneth N. Waltz, “America as a Model for the World? A Foreign Policy Perspective,” *PS*, December 1991, 669.

U.S. government recognized this problem immediately and stated that the United States “must account sufficiently for the interests of the large industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political or economic order.”⁴ France seems to perceive itself as a counterweight to the United States in Europe, as the French minister for foreign affairs, Hubert Védrine, in 1998 stressed that “we cannot accept a unipolar political world and therefore we will fight for a multipolar world.”⁵ To reach this goal France will attempt to influence and infuse its special domestic interests into the European Union’s security and defense policies.⁶

However, in the event an external threat does arise, like the attack on the World Trade Center in New York on September 11, 2001, alliances are able to overcome self-interests and respond in a mutually beneficial manner. Lacking such a threat it becomes impossible to reach congruence. These factors hinder the profitability and capacity of alliances to act in unison.




Figure 1. Progression of Transatlantic Relations

⁴ Patrick Tyler, “U.S. Strategy Plans for Insuring No Rivals Develop A One-Superpower World,” *New York Times*, March 8, 1992.

⁵ Matthias Rüb. *Der Atlantische Graben: Amerika und Europa auf getrennten Wegen* (Wien: Paul Zsolnay Verlag, 2004), 49.

⁶ Tony Chafer and Brian Jenkins, eds., 91.

The external threat is the defining variable. When a threat exists countries work together, if not they disperse (Figure 1). Figure 1 shows the course of relations between the United States and the European Union in the last decade. To demonstrate the validity of the theory, a detailed historical analysis is necessary, as well as an evaluation of existing alliances like NATO and the UN.

How transatlantic relations will develop in the future depends on the independent variable, or external threat. For a better understanding, it's important to describe the pertinent time periods, as each period serves as a binary test of my theory.

This hypothesis expects to discover how the presence or absence of an external threat dictates how transatlantic relations function. The continuing durability of western alliances is an important issue for the future. The presence or absence of an external threat defines whether or not Europe and the United States will cooperate in security alliances. Without, a threat such as the Soviet threat of the Cold War, will those alliances cooperate and overcome their internal differences? Realists would argue that the alliances will fail.

Given the U.S. dominance of the current unipolar world, alliances are in the danger of potential collapse under the weight of internal differences, as individual states lack the incentives to cooperate without a common external threat. As stated earlier future collective agreements among alliance members will not result in more cooperation, but in increased tension regarding future conflicts. This thesis will be based on a survey of pertinent primary and secondary scholarly literature on the topic: government publications, documented policies, and regional experts. The thesis analyzes the current transatlantic relations, examines the interests of the main actors, and makes recommendations how the relations may be improved.

Chapter II is a brief summary of the history of transatlantic relations after World War II, when security and stability in the West were connected to a number of institutions. NATO, the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) are only a few of them. I focus on, the EU and NATO, which bound the democracies together and facilitated political community.

In Chapter III I compare the U.S. Security Strategy with the European Security Strategy, which can be seen as a response to the U.S. Security Strategy. One section analyzes the differences between them and their impact on transatlantic relations. I also describe the transition from the “Weinberger Doctrine” (1984) to the “Rumsfeld Doctrine” and U.S. military “transformation” (beginning ca. 2001). “Embracing common liberal democratic norms and operating within interlocking multilateral institutions, the United States, western Europe, and, later, Japan built an enduring postwar order.”⁷ Transformation breaks with this tradition and can be seen as one of the key aspects for the deterioration in transatlantic relations.

Chapter IV examines the motivation behind French and German interests, because both countries, the largest members of the European Union, are key actors who influence the foreign policy of Europe and determine which direction the European Union will go. France is interested in global acting and uses the European Union to achieve that goal. French foreign policy is interested in a multipolar world in which France wants to balance the United States. This is not in Germany’s interest.⁸ This chapter analyzes how close partners in the European security-policy environment, approach and handle European security. How the Europeans address questions of war and peace influences security not only in Europe, but also throughout the greater world.

Chapter V assesses the transatlantic relationship in terms of security policy. As a basis, I analyze the values and security-policy interests of sovereign participants within NATO. Subsequently, I evaluate the particular characteristics of the transatlantic relation as institutionalized within NATO before the Prague summit of November 21, 2002. The change to the new NATO is reflected in the responsibility of the Alliance for security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region and its corresponding adaptation of the tasks it will most likely fulfill.

Chapter VI will attempt to draw conclusions as to whether or not Europe and the U.S. will be successful in their efforts to cooperate in security alliances. Are alliances a function of an external threat and what are the repercussions on transatlantic relations?

⁷ Paul Berman, “Terror and Liberalism,” (New York: Norton 2003), 85.

⁸ John Lloyd, “How Anti-Americanism Betrays the Left,” *Observer*, March 17, 2003.

The chapter will also make recommendations for how each side can improve transatlantic relations and how to use their experiences to ensure a mutually beneficial relationship in the future.

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II. HISTORICAL SUMMARY

A. THE COLD WAR PERIOD (1945-1991)

The Cold War was waged from 1946 until the breakdown of the Soviet Union in 1991. The United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the world's two superpowers as a direct result of World War II. A possible worldwide confrontation between these two powers loomed at the end of the war and began to appear in headlines almost immediately, as the confrontation infringed more and more on Europe itself.⁹ According to Robert O. Paxton, there is no doubt that the insatiable political aims of Stalin after World War II could only have been curtailed by a countervailing United States power. While the security of the Soviet state and its satellite Communist regimes had priority in 1945, Stalin's expansionist ambitions grew during the early years of the Cold War.¹⁰

This chapter argues that the threat of Soviet Union expansionism after 1945 was the driving force behind the increasing cohesion and later integration of western European states. Because both were suffering under the Soviet threat, it became possible for such historical enemies as France and Germany to join the same alliance and lay the cornerstone for the European Union. Nevertheless, it took no less than a decade before security and stability in the West would be understood to be tied to a number of institutions. In this chapter I focus on the European theater and on the EU and NATO, which bound the democracies together and facilitated the political community.

The second part of the chapter turns to the post Cold War period to investigate if and how the disappearance of the external threat caused the deterioration of relations between United States and Europe. While the United States significantly increased its military expenditures, Europe strove to harvest the so called peace dividend.

Unfortunately, such an arrangement was not in the United States' interest; it wanted military "burden sharing." In reality, "burden sharing" in the United States sense meant "burden shifting" to the European nations. They were reserved to load this burden.

⁹ Deutscher Bundestag, *Frager an die deutsche Geschichte: Ideen, Kräfte und Entscheidungen*, 17th ed. (Bonn: Bundesdruckerei, 1993), 368.

¹⁰ Robert O. Paxton, *Europe in the Twentieth Century*, 4th ed. (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing, 2004), 471.

When the Cold War ended, Germany was the only country in Europe which was able to present a so-called “Gesamtkonzept,” or roadmap for the future, outlining how European integration should continue. This concept anticipated a “deepening” and “widening” of the European Union.¹¹ It showed that the old “German question” had been solved, “that Europe’s supranational cooperation was no freak by-product of the Soviet threat but a permanent rejection of a two-millennium history of bloodshed.”¹²

B. UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE IN THE COLD WAR PERIOD

In the peacetime between WWI and WWII, the United States practiced an isolationist foreign policy, but that ended with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Isolationism had not, however, inhibited the U.S. “from opening the door to Asia in the nineteenth century, from the economic internationalism that followed, or from the interventions of 1917 and 1941.”¹³ Obviously, United States had become an active world power long before the end of WWII, but the U.S. security situation after the war was different. As a direct result of the rapid technological development of long-distance airplanes, airplane carriers, submarines, and atomic weapons, the United States mainland was more vulnerable than ever before. These changes came to dominate the thinking of United States policy makers, inspiring them to take a more active role in world policies. In the aftermath of World War II, the United States was the only remaining power able “to contain the Soviet threat.”¹⁴ By 1947, the United States and the Soviet Union had dissolved their alliance because of deep ideological differences. The breakdown of the relationship was a direct result of Stalin’s violation of the 1945 Yalta accords, the violent influence of Soviet-dominated governments on unwilling eastern Europe countries, and an aggressive Soviet expansionism.¹⁵ The Soviet Union displaced its borders west and, in

¹¹ “Deepening the integration of its members into the Community and widening the membership.” Elisabeth Pond, *Friendly Fire: The Near-Death of the Transatlantic Alliance*. (Pittsburgh: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), xiii.

¹² *Ibid*, xiv.

¹³ Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State*. (Cambridge: University Press, 1998), 2.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, 2.

¹⁵ Robert O. Paxton, 519.

the process, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, parts of Finland, East Prussia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania lost their independence. Poland was moved westward and, as was also the case in Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania and East-Germany, its governments were “controlled by rigid communist regimes.”¹⁶ These events inspired Winston Churchill in 1946 to profess that an “iron curtain” had fallen in Europe to separate the eastern from the western hemisphere.¹⁷ The United States tried to play the leading role in Europe and form the western countries together into a bloc, but the means of this bloc-building differed radically from that of the Soviet Union. Stalin needed the wealth of eastern European countries for reconstruction, and he feared he would lose control of eastern Europe unless he was able to govern it more directly.¹⁸ The countries had no freely elected governments, no pluralistic state system, and no openness to western free trade and travel.¹⁹

The United States reinforced the cohesion of the western European countries mainly by indirect incentives. The Marshall plan, constructed as help for self-help, earmarked this kind of policy. Washington impelled the western countries to “morally and politically” join together and, in the process, initiated the beginning of European integration.²⁰ The new post-war United States foreign policy of a world without barriers to trade and investment stood in marked contrast to Stalin’s closed spheres of influence.

There were, however, early disagreements between the United States and its western European allies. Since Yalta, the United States had tried to convince Great Britain and France that it was time to grant independence to their colonies, but the French feared that the United States harbored hidden ambitions to replace the French economic presence, especially in Indochina.²¹ These conflicts were largely caused by United States foreign policy, which established a worldwide free market, with the dollar as the strongest currency, and where American companies were able to act freely.

¹⁶ Robert O. Paxton , 516.

¹⁷ Deutscher Bundestag, 368.

¹⁸ Robert O. Paxton, 520.

¹⁹ Ibid, 471.

²⁰ Ludolf Herbst, *Option für den Westen: Vom Marshallplan bis zum deutsch-französischen Vertrag*, (München: DTV, 1989), 8.

²¹ Robert O. Paxton, 475.

However, the Soviet Union was strong enough to set up its own sphere of influence where Western trade, companies, and money had no access. By September 1949, the Soviet Union had successfully tested an atomic bomb, and the availability of nuclear weapons on both sides made war unfavorable. Each side possessed an overwhelming capability of annihilating the enemy. Peace was impossible because each side claimed universal ideological legitimacy.²² Instead, the United States accused the Soviet Union of seeking to expand its communist ideology around the world. The Soviet Union supported worldwide movements for colonial independence and ethnic separation. At the same time, the Soviet Union charged the United States with practicing imperialism. Both sides struggled for the enlargement of their respective political hemispheres, especially for the upper hand in the emerging new nations in Africa and Asia.²³ The means by which these kinds of wars were fought were coups, guerilla-warfare, and civil wars supported openly or covered by the opponents. The Cold War era was characterized by mutual distrust, suspicion, and misunderstandings by both the United States and the Soviet Union. Cold war techniques were “economic penetration, intellectual persuasion, and subversive propaganda as well as more traditional forms of political and military influence” which were used to weaken the enemy.²⁴

The Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and countless proxy wars, mainly in third-world countries, were occasions when the tensions between the ideologies turned into hot war. In sum, the United States objective was to prevent Soviet expansionism by mainly defensive measures, based on a network of treaty organizations led by the United States containment policy. Fortunately, the major world powers never entered armed conflict directly against each other. Nevertheless, the fear of a confrontation in central Europe welded the western European nations together. Their need to defend western Europe in case of a military conflict with the Soviet Union was the main reason they accepted the leadership role of the United States as a protective power in Europe.

²² Robert O. Paxton, 533.

²³ Ibid, 534.

²⁴ Ibid, 534.

C. EUROPE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THE COLD WAR

The hot spot, and therefore United States top priority, in the beginning cold war between 1945 and 1949 was western Europe, particularly Germany, where a zonal border matched the separation between the western and Soviet zones of occupation and divided the former German capital, Berlin. This development loomed shortly after Yalta. The victorious powers decided that Germany had to be dismembered, but did not lay down the specific way to dismember it. Instead, occupation zones were specified that were supposed to be controlled by a single unified Allied Control Commission.²⁵ The Conference of Potsdam, from July to August 1945, was unable to solve the problem. Calls for the economical unity of Germany and for the remake of a democratic political order were vague and only partially acceptable to the different conceivabilities of the victor powers. This is why the unified Allied Control Commission was unable to work properly. Over time, the real decision-making power came to be held more and more by the chiefs of the military governments of the occupation zones. All four zones realized their own aims and interests, all of which were fundamentally different from the others, but only in their own particular zone. While the United States and Great Britain wanted to restore the German economy as fast as possible, the Soviet Union and France tried to extract as much benefit as they could out of Germany in order to rebuilt their destroyed countries. The motivation behind the United States/British plan was clear: without a recovered German economy, the United States would have “to feed and supply Germans and Europeans for a long time.”²⁶ On the other hand, the Soviet claim for reparations and its attempts to merge parts or even the whole of Germany into its reach caused tension between the victor powers and prepared the ground for a German “Westbindung.” Paxton stresses that “from the American point of view, the Soviets were simply stripping Germany of the means to live in a free enterprise world.”²⁷

However, after the unsuccessful conferences of the foreign ministers in April in Moscow, and in November/December 1947 in London, American leaders took the initiative and started to support the anti-Communist governments in Turkey, Greece, and

²⁵ Deutscher Bundestag, 344.

²⁶ Robert O. Paxton, 480.

²⁷ Ibid, 480.

South Korea and to rebuild the destroyed European states as a counterweight to the Soviet bloc. With the support of Great Britain, and later France, the western occupation zones of Germany were brought into this program. The Marshall Plan built a functioning economic system for western Europe, as economic aid ended the dollar shortage and stimulated private investment for reconstruction. For the United States, the Marshall plan eradicated the remaining symptoms of the prewar economical crisis and transitioned the United States economy to over-production by establishing, expanding, and maintaining a European demand for American exports.²⁸ Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, which were initially interested in taking part in this program, were actively detained from doing so by the Soviet Union. The division of Europe was unstoppable and, despite the vigor and passion of their attempt, German efforts to prevent their own partition failed.²⁹ Above all else, the French government was intent on preventing a German reunification.³⁰

After the failed Soviet blockade of Berlin in 1949, the frontiers and boundaries became frozen throughout Europe and remained so for a generation. The formerly powerful European nations lost their influence as the two newly emerged superpowers circled each other. While eastern European countries were suppressed under Soviet rule, western European nations became dependant on the United States and its umbrella of protecting power. To balance the rising threat from the Soviet Union, the United States extended its military influence within Europe, and, in April 1949, western Europe and North America joined together to sign the Treaty of Washington, which forged the foundation of NATO.³¹ The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, initially an alliance of twelve states (1949), faced 175 Soviet divisions massed in eastern Europe and were later organized by the Warsaw Pact (1955).³² Hidden political and economic agendas about

²⁸ Robert O. Paxton, 475.

²⁹ Deutscher Bundestag, 368.

³⁰ Ibid, 347.

³¹ The Brussels Treaty (March 1948) tied five European countries together: Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom agreed to develop a common defense system. The Treaty of Washington (April 1949) brought into being a common security-system-based transatlantic partnership between the U.S., Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, and Norway. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), 29.

³² Robert O. Paxton, 602.

German rearmament existed in Washington, London, and Bonn even before the Korea war. Among the European public, this topic had been discussed since 1948. The Berlin blockade, the explosion of the first Soviet nuclear bomb in the autumn of 1949, as well as the victory of the communists in China (1949) intensified those discussions. It was only a question of time before a nuclear stalemate between the United States and the Soviet Union would increase the probability of a conventional war. The armament industry of the Soviet Union was predominant, in particular if China is added to the communist potential.³³ Because the French army was engaged in Indochina and Great Britain's army was similarly active in Malaya, it became desirable to augment the standing European forces with German troops. The United States, especially, put political pressure on Paris, which still refused to consent to German rearmament. In September 1950, the United States confronted the west European nations with an alternative, to rearm their armies and be reinforced by U.S. troops, or no reinforcement by U.S. troops in Europe. Under the influence of the Korean War, this triggered fears in western Europe and enabled German rearmament.³⁴

The failed French-German project of the EPC led to the initiation into NATO, to the end of the occupation in Germany, and, to Germany's subsequent military rearmament. Greece and Turkey became signatory members of the NATO treaty in 1952, the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982.³⁵ To increase stability in the region, the United States also supported the idea of an integrated and sovereign Europe which would be "more than just an extension of United States influence."³⁶ The two superpowers confronted each other, one finger on the weapon which could destroy the world, across a wall that cut Europe into two parts. From 1952-1959, American intervention against the Soviet divisions would mean "massive retaliation" on the battleground of Europe as a massive nuclear response in case of an Soviet advance into western Europe. During that time, western Europeans were threatened by what Arnold

³³ Ludolf Herbst, 89.

³⁴ Ibid, 91.

³⁵ Ibid, 30.

³⁶ Peter W. Rodman, *Drifting apart? Trends in U.S.-European Relations*. (Washington D.C.: The Nixon Center, June 1999), 69.

Toynbee called: “Annihilation without representation.”³⁷ “Massive retaliation” was replaced by “graduated deterrence,” which did nothing to change the disadvantages faced by Central Europe, which would still be the battlefield of a nuclear confrontation. Many Europeans saw in this development “a growing reluctance of the United States to use nuclear force.”³⁸ De Gaulle was the first European leader to articulate this sentiment officially by advancing the idea of an independent French nuclear force.³⁹ Also, the German Great Coalition (1966-1969) did not want to sign the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty. In March 1963, the United States proposed a Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF). This proposal was unsuccessful (1964) because of French contradictions.⁴⁰

However, the destruction and the sorrow of two world wars was the direct result of political differences between France and Germany and the cold war system of bloc confrontation in Europe led to the discernment of a new beginning between the two countries. The idea of an European Economic Community in 1957 (Treaty of Rome), the early predecessor of the European Union (EU), was based on improved trade and economic development between member states in a Europe still struggling with the outcome of WWII. The fundamental objective of these efforts was rapprochement between Germany and its former enemies to support stability on the European continent.⁴¹ The idea was that strong binding would prevent a revival of a German “Sonderweg” between East and West, which would cause a “power vacuum,” and tempt the Soviets to strive for hegemony in Middle Europe.⁴² Already, in the early 1950s the United States recognized clearly that efforts for European integration would fail if there was no long-term solution to the French–German antagonism. Hence, the United States` European policy included the furtherance of reconciliation between the two countries. An integrated West-Europe without the Federal Republic of Germany would have been

³⁷ Quoted in Hans W. Gatzke, “The Present in Perspective,” 3rd ed. (New York, 1965), 18; in Robert O. Paxton, *Europe in the Twentieth Century*, 534.

³⁸ Robert O. Paxton, 599.

³⁹ Ibid, 599.

⁴⁰ Ibid, 599.

⁴¹ Paul Gallis, “France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and Issues in U.S.–French Relations.” Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, February 4, 2005, 5.

⁴² Jeffrey Herf, *War by other Means: Soviet Power, West German Resistance, and the Battle of Euromissiles* (Toronto: Free Press, 1991), 13.

neither economically nor strategically maintainable.⁴³ For Washington, west European integration including the Federal Republic of Germany meant the following: First, a reinforcement against the Soviet threat, second, to anchor Germany to the west; and third, the United States recognized the important role that Germany could play in the predefinition of the course of the European Community (EC).⁴⁴ Jolyon Howorth argues that, historically, “From the middle of the nineteenth century, French security policy constantly oscillated between, on the one hand, the attractions but inconvenience of alliances and, on the other hand, the status but inadequacy of independence.”⁴⁵ De Gaulle decided in 1966 to remove France from the integrated military command of NATO. Problems occurred when de Gaulle’s policy queried the U.S.-European concept and presented his French model for European order. Unfortunately, nobody seriously thought that France after WWII would be more than a medium-rank power.⁴⁶ I analyze this problem in detail in Chapter IV.

1. Brandt’s Policy of Détente

The policy of détente (1963-1969) tried to overcome the deadlock between the two power blocs. This kind of realist policy ignored the interests of central Europe and attempted to inspire change through rapprochement. Willi Brandt and Egon Bahr were the main political actors behind this movement, and their policy of “Ostpolitik” led to a new relationship between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union and, as a result, to eastern Europe. The idea of “Ostpolitik” was born out of the frustration of a divided country, located on the battlefield between two superpowers, trying to find a peaceful solution for the future. Brandt’s aim, therefore, was to dismantle the wall that had been erected across central Europe.⁴⁷ He recognized that the key to a change of the relationship to eastern Europe lay in Moscow. With the Moscow Treaty of August 1970, he acknowledged the existing German frontiers. Germany now had three options of

⁴³ Eckart Conze, *Die gaullistische Herausforderung: Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen in der amerikanischen Europapolitik 1958-1963* (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1995), 14.

⁴⁴ Eckart Conze, 89.

⁴⁵ Tony Chafer and Brian Jenkins, eds., *France from the Cold War to the New World Order* (New York: St. Martins Press, 1996), 18.

⁴⁶ Ibid, 23.

political orientation: the Atlantic, the European, and the Russian. The European powers, however, feared détente would only lead to the revival of the “German problem.” They were apprehensive as to the potential consequences of reviving German neutralism and an independent German policy balanced between East and West. France and Great Britain feared the ghost of a “new Rapallo” with German military cooperation with Russia.⁴⁸ Paxton argues that the “opening of the Soviet bloc to western European and American economic penetration was a silent revolution of the 1970’s.” Western European countries sold advanced equipment, food stuffs, and consumer goods to the Soviet Union and its satellites. The United States was the main foreign supplier of Russian grain, but, nevertheless, the military threat persisted.

2. The Euromissiles Crisis

The Euromissiles crisis was much more than a political debate. Already in 1962, Helmut Schmidt, the German chancellor from 1974-1982, discerned “The Soviet Union is now a power of unprecedented and commanding military potential and shows every sign of being aware of this advantageous change in the situation.”⁴⁹ Germany and other western European countries feared that the American nuclear guarantee for western Europe could erode in case of a strategic nuclear superiority in ICBMs, which might allow the Soviets to launch limited conventional attacks. The situation deteriorated in the early 1970s, when the Soviets continued to deploy more and more nuclear weapons. SALT I (1969-1972) and SALT II (1972-1979) were attempts, to reduce the nuclear arms arsenals.⁵⁰ The Soviet Union and the United States had an interest in doing so, because the maintenance of huge arsenals of nuclear weapons was expensive and reduced the available expenditures for more modern weapons. However, the central assumption of 1975 was that the Soviets were able to launch a surprise attack on western Europe “practically with no preparation time left.”⁵¹ The nuclear potential of France and Great Britain was an additional risk factor for the Soviet Union, but did not counterbalance

⁴⁷ Robert O. Paxton, 601.

⁴⁸ Robert O. Paxton, 603.

⁴⁹ Jeffrey Herf, 48.

⁵⁰ Robert O. Paxton, 602.

⁵¹ Jeffrey Herf, 50.

their medium-range weapons.⁵² Economical and technical progress identifiable in terms of Soviet nuclear rockets, airplanes, ships, and submarines and worldwide maneuvers of the Soviet Fleet reinforced the fear of a Soviet attack. While the western European economies were suffering the effects of a second oil crisis (1979), it seemed that the Soviet industry was growing. The strong dependence of western European economies on oil from third-world countries caused a double risk. Oil deliveries could be interrupted or delayed.⁵³ The Soviet invasion in Afghanistan (1980) shocked the western world again. The shift to détente under heads of state Jimmy Carter, James Callaghan, Helmut Schmidt⁵⁴ and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing turned to a conservative policy change under Ronald Reagan (1981), Margaret Thatcher (1981), Helmut Kohl (1982), and François Mitterrand (1981).

The 40th United States President, Ronald Reagan, decided to actively oppose the Soviet threat. Reagan planned to confront the Soviets on three fronts: first, the economic, which aimed at decreasing Soviet access to high technology; second, the military, increasing U.S. defense expenditures, to strengthen the U.S. negotiation position with the aim of forcing the Soviet Union to spend more money on defense expenditures; and third, the global, by supporting resistance against the Soviet Union throughout the entire world.⁵⁵

3. The Collapse of the Soviet Union

The collapse of the Soviet Union was, for the free world, an unforeseen event that happened in stages. Ronald Reagan's "zero-tolerance" policy came to fruition as, over time, the Soviet Union systematically lost the arms race. For the Soviet Union, several unfavorable factors came together: economic stagnation, environmental pollution, declining public health, and, most important, citizens' increasing frustration and loss of

⁵² Jeffrey Herf, 51.

⁵³ Ibid, 52.

⁵⁴ Chancellor Helmut Schmidt had been outmaneuvered on the question of a "NATO two-track decision" by his own party in fall 1982. He "began the process of a decisive shift in the momentum of the global balance of forces, but he was unable to shift the balance of power in his own party." Jeffrey Herbst, 143.

⁵⁵ Ibid, 141.

faith in the Soviet system, which awakened the dissatisfaction of the Soviet Union's populations and its satellites.⁵⁶ These events became manifest in the reluctance, or incapacity, of Soviet authorities to intervene against the break-up of its sphere of power. Four main reasons for the relatively fast breakdown can be identified. First, economic failure – the net income fell 17 percent in 1991 alone. Second, on April 26, 1986, the nuclear power plant in Chernobyl exploded. Many people were killed, 300,000 had to leave their homes, millions of others were affected. Third, the Soviet army was not able to establish a satellite regime in Afghanistan. That ten-year war (1979-1989) ruined the Russian economy, cost heavy casualties, and disclosed the backwardness of the Soviet system. And fourth, with Mikhail Gorbachev, a new generation of communist leaders, came to power. Gorbachev saw himself as a reformer in instituting his unprecedented policy of “openness” (glasnost) and “restructuring” (prerestroika).⁵⁷ Without Soviet backing, the communist regimes in satellite states such as Poland, the Baltic States, eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Albania were wiped out within several months.⁵⁸ A detailed analysis of the reasons why the Soviet Union collapsed is not important for this particular work and, therefore, will not be considered further. What is important is that the external threat of conventional attack from the Soviet Union was completely removed for eastern and western European countries by 1991.⁵⁹ In December 1991, the Soviet Union was replaced by a Russian federation consisting of fourteen more or less independent states.⁶⁰

D. THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD (1991-2001)

Shortly before the breakdown of the Soviet Union (1991), the two plus four treaty (1990) regulated the details of German reunification. The main conditions outlined in the treaty, which provided a continuing commitment to maintaining NATO and the European

⁵⁶ Robert O. Paxton, 602.

⁵⁷ Ibid, 650.

⁵⁸ Ibid, 654.

⁵⁹ Gorbachev was interested in reducing military expenditures because he needed the money for economical and social reforms. He accepted Ronald Reagan's “zero-tolerance” policy and reduced Soviet nuclear and conventional weapon arsenals significantly. Robert O. Paxton, 656.

⁶⁰ Ibid, 656.

Community, preventing Germany from developing nuclear capabilities, and encouraging general military force reductions, guaranteed the inviolability of borders governed by the Helsinki Final Act, and supported a peaceful, gradual, reunification process.⁶¹ Germany gained its reunification in exchange for deeper European integration and the commitment to remain in NATO. To make this transition toward a deeper European integration irrevocable, Germany sacrificed its national currency.

Germany was the only country in Europe that was able to present a so-called “Gesamtkonzept”, or roadmap, for the future: how the European integration should continue.⁶² In all reality, however, German leadership in Europe was neither advisable nor desired. Instead, the European powers thought how to keep the reviewed unified German economic power in the “European basket.” German policy since reunification has tried to integrate the old “Mitteleuropa” into the EU and NATO by way of enlargement. On the one hand, Germany was a clear winner in the reunification process, as this development opened new foreign markets in the East. On the other hand, it had to pay billions to alleviate Soviet sins in East Germany, such as inefficient and unprofitable industry, a large standing military-force structure, and political and social stratification that had handicapped East Germany’s overall development.⁶³

However difficult and economically challenging the concept of “deepening” the integration of its members and “widening” the membership proved to be, it was declaredly the aim of the European Union. Deepening the European Union would prove to have its limits, which were directly determined by the manifold interests of the nation states in Europe. That is why, with the noted exception of the monetary and trade policy aspects, the EU remained a relatively loose confederation of nation states. The European Single Act of 1986 changed all of this. It proposed the transfer of labor, capital, and services; a single European currency; and a common foreign and military policy.⁶⁴ Finally, the Maastricht Treaty (1992) created the European Union and initiated not only

⁶¹ Frank Costigliola, “An Arm Around the Shoulder: United States, NATO and German Reunification 1989-90,” *ContEurHist* 3, 1992, 103.

⁶² Elisabeth Pond, XIII.

⁶³ Ibid, 105.

⁶⁴ Robert O. Paxton, 674.

the European Monetary Fund but also a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).⁶⁵ “Widening” of the European Union was important to project security in and around Europe and to give eastern European countries struggling with building up new constitutional regimes, social societies, economies, and value systems a chance for stability. The rapid economical and political success of transitioning eastern European states in the 1990s finally made their membership in the EU realistic.

At the same time, the United States continued to view itself as a “European power,” a status it was determined to maintain, regardless of whether or not the Bush and Clinton administrations had an interest in convincing European governments to take over leadership in Europe and care for security on the European continent.⁶⁶ Indeed, the failed EU attempts to end the Yugoslav Civil War (1989-1996) had shown that it was “dangerous and unrealistic” to believe that United States leadership was no longer needed in Europe.⁶⁷ The Gulf War of 1991 had unequivocally shown the superiority and the capability gap between United States and European forces. The European impotence in its efforts to end the Yugoslav Civil War showed the European inability to act independently of the United States.

Another arena in which the Europeans might pool their resources, and where the United States used to occupy a leadership role, was NATO. At the Brussels summit in 1994, the sixteen member countries reaffirmed that NATO was open for membership by other European states.⁶⁸ Thanks to the integration of eastern Europe countries into the EU and NATO, currently, there are no military conflicts that, which would necessitate an American engagement expected in Europe. The EU and NATO enlargements are further steps toward enhancing security and extending stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area.

At NATO’s 1996 Berlin summit, an agreement was reached that outlined provisions whereby the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) would rely on

⁶⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook, 99.

⁶⁶ Christina von Balis and Simon Servaty, eds., *Visions of America and Europe: September 11, Iraq and Transatlantic Relations* (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2004), 30.

⁶⁷ The Clinton administration had helped to undermine the UN-EU plan for Bosnia in 1993. *Ibid*, 30.

⁶⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook, 61.

NATO assets. The aim was to be able to conduct military missions in autonomous ways. The so-called “Petersberg Tasks” empowered the West European Union to carry out a modest set of military missions,⁶⁹ but the 1999 Kosovo campaign not only showed the European military weakness again, but also the United States willingness for unilateral action. Left behind was a slight sense that the Europeans had hampered the United States efforts to destroy the Milosevic regime.⁷⁰ The experiences from the Kosovo war were the main motivation for EU decisions to build up a 60,000-men-strong rapid reaction force, a military and security committee, and a military staff.⁷¹ I will focus on this topic in detail in Chapter V.

This development of European military capabilities was undertaken with restraint. On the one hand, the United States criticized the lack of EU capabilities, and, on the other hand, it feared that decoupling from NATO could cause double capabilities, discrimination of against non-EU but NATO-member countries, and the loss of leadership through NATO.⁷² I will focus on this topic in detail in Chapter V.

On September 12, 2001, less than twenty-four hours after the terrorist attacks on the United States, the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s governing body, invoked Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty for the first time in the Alliance’s history. In doing so, NATO declared that the attack against the United States was to be regarded as an attack against all nineteen members of the NATO community. This invocation of Article V demonstrated NATO’s intention to play a role in the response to the attacks of 09/11, and, in reaction to requests for assistance from the United States, NATO allies have taken several measures to assist in the global war on terrorism.

E. CONCLUSION

Europe’s former foreign policy consensus held a relatively simple view of the world, in which the Soviet Union and its satellites were seen as aggressors who sought to

⁶⁹ Ibid, 99. The “Petersberg tasks,” set out in the Amsterdam treaty of 1997, consist of humanitarian and rescue tasks, and peacekeeping tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacekeeping.

⁷⁰ Especially the air operation, with its selection of targets by committee, was an impressive example how the U.S. had allowed others to tie its hands. Christina von Balis and Simon Servaty, eds., 33.

⁷¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook, 102.

⁷² Christina v. Balis and Simon Servaty, eds., 30.

expand and take over parts of the free world. The objective of the traditional consensus was to prevent Soviet expansionism by means of mainly defensive measures based on a network of treaty organizations guided by the United States containment policy. The impotence of the European nations, ability to defend themselves against the Soviet threat made them dependent upon United States protective power. The idea of a European Economic Community was based on improved trade and economic development between member states in a Europe still struggling with the outcome of World War II. The fundamental objective of those efforts was rapprochement between Germany and its former enemies to support stability on the European continent. This rapprochement was possible because an external threat forced France and Germany to combine their interests.

Détente was an attempt to decrease tensions between East and West and, indeed, the policy was able to open up new markets, even though this was never the real intention of Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr. Quite the reverse: while “Europeans and Americans shared hopes that détente would somehow lessen the threat of nuclear war, the practical effects of détente were to emphasize divergences between Western Europe and the United States.”⁷³

I have argued that the threat of Soviet Union expansionism was the reason for the increasing cohesion and later integration of the western European states after 1945. Because they were both suffering under the Soviet threat, it was possible for historical enemies like France and Germany to join the same alliance and, in the process, lay the cornerstone for the European Union and a new, peaceful order between nation-states in Europe. The concept of deepening and widening the European Union was important to project security in and around Europe and to give eastern European countries struggling to build up new constitutional regimes, social societies, economies, and value systems a chance for stability. It showed that the old “German question” had been solved and “that Europe’s supranational cooperation was no freak by-product of the Soviet threat but a permanent rejection of a two-millennium history of bloodshed.”⁷⁴ In the case of the European Union, the lack of an external threat did not reduce the inclination of consent or the level of cooperation among the participants. With respect to the transatlantic alliance,

⁷³ Robert O. Paxton, 603.

⁷⁴ Ibid, xiv.

it can be determined that, during the Cold War Period, the cohesion was high, despite troubles. But, with the lack of an external threat, consent and the degree of cooperation has declined in the Post-Cold War era.

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III. THE NEW UNITED STATES

A. THE MISSION DEFINES THE COALITION

We are witnesses to a time period that includes fundamental changes in the environment of the Atlantic system. Two specific occurrences have modified the international security landscape decisively: first, the end of the Cold War period and, second, the new threat of international terrorism.

The French scholar Francois Heisbourg summarizes the four main changes. First, the United States is the sole superpower and will not accept competitors. Second, “the mission makes the coalition,” which means that multilateral alliances no longer have the priority they had during the Cold War. Third, the acquisition of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by states of concern has now been compounded by the threat of proliferation in the hands of non-state terrorist groups. This is why the United States had to legitimize its strategies of prevention and preemption to support and justify its actions. Fourth, Europe’s role has changed from that of an equal security partner to that of an area of major strategic concern, especially because of its collective refusal to rearm.⁷⁵ This chapter will examine the impact of 9/11 in terms of its influence on United States foreign policy and the divergent historical perspectives between the United States and Europe. By comparing the National Security Strategy of the United States and the European Security Strategy, I will analyze common interests and dividing lines between the two powers. A subsequent comparison of the “Weinberger Doctrine” (1984) and the “Rumsfeld Doctrine” (2001) will show that the doctrines stand in marked contrast. “Embracing common liberal democratic norms and operating within interlocking multilateral institutions, the United States, western Europe, and later, Japan built an enduring postwar order.”⁷⁶ I will argue that the transformation inspired by the United States adoption of the so-called “Rumsfeld Doctrine” broke with tradition and can be seen as one of the key aspects for the deterioration of the transatlantic relations.

⁷⁵ Francois Heisbourg, “The Transatlantic Strategic Relationship: From Lapsed Alliance to New Partnership,” in: *Jahrbuch für Internationale Sicherheitspolitik 2003*, ed. Erich Reiter (Hamburg: Mittler Verlag 2003), 331.

⁷⁶ Paul Berman, *Terror and Liberalism* (New York: Norton Press, 2003), 85.

Furthermore, Chapter III is an attempt to determine what implications these historical differences will have on the future development of the Atlantic system. This chapter will argue that there is now less reason than ever to cherish hopes for the future of the Atlantic Alliance.

B. THE IMPACT OF 9/11 ON UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND ITS EFFECTS IN EUROPE

For the United States, the end of the 20th century was also the end of the age of geopolitics. The age of world politics has inevitably begun.⁷⁷ During the Cold War, the American security strategy aimed at preventing the Soviet Union from dominating the European continent. This was ultimately achieved through the breakdown and collapse of the Soviet Union. Since that time, the United States has altered its view of itself and of the world. The serious attack on the American mainland united the American population like no other incident since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (1941). The latter incident led, as is well known, to the active United States involvement in WWII.

In the United States, foreign and security policies are developed jointly between the President and Congress, between the central government in Washington and the states, between political and economical interests, between protectionists and free traders, and so on. Mead differentiates between four main streams in current United States foreign policy,⁷⁸ beginning with the “Hamiltonian,” named for Alexander Hamilton (1755-1804), who was minister of financial affairs under George Washington. Hamiltonians strove to form a close relationship between government and large-scale industry, to integrate the aspiring industrial and bank powers, to conduct political stability, and to achieve economical prosperity. The “Wilsonian,” outlook was named after President Wilson (1856-1924), who was in office from 1913 to 1921, during WWI. Wilsonians see America as having a moral obligation to promote the ideas and values of the American democracy in the world and to enforce the mastery of right in the international system. Wilson said: “The world will not be safe unless it’s democratic.” In

⁷⁷ Heinrich Kreft, “Weltpolitik statt Geopolitik: Die amerikanische Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik im Zeichen des Grauen Krieges,” in: *Jahrbuch für Internationale Sicherheitspolitik 2003*, ed. Erich Reiter. (Hamburg: Mittler Verlag, 2003), 441.

direct contrast to Wilsonian reasoning is the “Jeffersonian,” named for Thomas Jefferson (1742-1826), who was in office from 1801 to 1809. Jeffersonians want to reduce American foreign involvement to a minimum and see the security of democracy in the United States as their main interest. The “Jacksonian” perspective, named after the seventh president of the United States, Andrew Jackson (1767-1845), who was in office from 1829 to 1837, saw his main task as the physical security and economical welfare of its citizens. “Jacksonians” do not want to be involved in disputes with foreign powers, except when the United States is attacked, at which time they postulate a decisive engagement employing the whole of United States strength. These political currents do not follow directly from one another; rather, they stand beside each other and have had the same relevance from Americas foundation to the present. Because they are considered universal, they can be seen as an explanation of why a majority of Americans are convinced that the American social system is the best in the world and that the world would be better off if it would just act more like America. So it should not be surprising that in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the United States immediately took the offensive and tried to neutralize or to overwhelm the danger, instead of passively acquiescing. It is also not surprising that expansion is seen as the right path to security, a tenor which directly led the United States to wage a war against terrorism: a war the United States will fight until it is won.

France and Germany also recognized that Iraq is a problem, but they did not support war as solution. Instead, the Europeans warned that an occupation of Iraq would provoke more terrorism and a destabilized Arab world.⁷⁹ Now these governments find themselves in a dilemma: the more they reject the use of military power to solve specific international problems, the more they reinforce the conclusion that consultation and cooperation is a waste of time. This is why NATO, unfortunately, is no longer the primary forum for United States foreign and security policy.

European history is a history of revolution and war. These wars were fought on European soil, and the collective memories of the last devastating war are still very vivid

⁷⁸ Walter Russell Mead, *Power Terror, Peace, and War, Americas Grand Strategy in a World at Risk*. (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004), 54.

⁷⁹ Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, *Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis over Iraq*. (New York: McGraw Hill, 2004), 128.

and influential. Fifteen years after the end of the Cold War, Europe's former enemy, Russia, has become an important trading partner. The largest European countries account for over a half of Russia's foreign trade and the bulk of its foreign debt. Germany is the main consumer of Russia's energy resources. Russia had reasons to support France and Germany in their approach to oppose the Iraq war, but France and Germany, who welcomed Russia's decision with relief, had other reasons for their anti-American attitude. It was their chance to save face in a losing game. The irreconcilable attitude on the issue of military escalation around Iraq threatened France and Germany with a political vacuum.⁸⁰ Belgium was the only country in Europe to dare support them. It was clear that most of the EU and, especially, the East European countries would support the United States line. The question remains, however: what was the underlying reason France and Germany opted for a pacifist attitude? Under the influence of an external threat, NATO's members had been mostly successful in maintaining a common strategy within Europe. Without such a common threat they have often disagreed on the best course of action, especially in regard to the rest of the world.⁸¹

Again, as so often in the history of NATO, the tune was clearly set by Paris, which has pursued an independent international policy ever since Charles de Gaulle instituted it nearly sixty years ago.⁸² The population of France (many of whom are Moslems) feared that the Iraq war would provoke a new stage of terrorism and violence, the destructive consequences of which, citizens of the French fifth Republic had experienced long before 9/11.⁸³ In addition, France has economic interests in the Middle East. In the past few decades, the fifth Republic has been trying not to endanger its relations with the Arab world.

Germany also had its own reasons. The widespread rumor that Chancellor Schröder is fighting for peace because the majority of Germans are against the war is hardly justified.⁸⁴ Germany's population is more concerned about their own economic

⁸⁰ Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, 133.

⁸¹ Ibid, 19.

⁸² Philip H. Gordon, *A certain idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist legacy*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 5.

⁸³ Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, 79.

⁸⁴ Ibid, 98.

problems than about Saddam Hussein's future. Those pacifist ideations did not appear to help Social Democrats and Greens during Germany's recent local elections (the last one in Schleswig-Holstein), in which the ruling coalition lost.⁸⁵ Schröder campaigned against the United States and a possible Iraq war, and George W. Bush's unwillingness to forgive the chancellor's actions drove the German government into the arms of the French, who have supported Chirac to maintain his antiwar decision.⁸⁶

Since World War II, Germany has hardly ever expressed foreign policy ambitions, although this does not mean that it has none. As a divided nation during the Cold War at the front line of confrontations, Germany did not have the possibility, and later did not have a chance, to realize those ambitions. Germany's current involvement in the "anti-war alliance" can be seen as an attempt to position itself as an independent player on the world scene. It seems like the politics of the nineteenth century are coming back. Fortunately, the main difference between the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century and the present is that Germany is now integrated into a network of alliances, a common market, and bilateral/multilateral treaties.

The United States as Hegemon – What are the interests of the United States in maintaining its membership in these alliances? Alliances are a catalyst for the United States to exercise its superior influence in collective organizations. In addition, they permit burden-sharing by maintenance of trade relations and, prevent the emergence of another superpower. The initial draft of the Pentagon's Defense Planning Guidance states: "we must account sufficiently for the interests of the large industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political or economic order" and "we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role."⁸⁷ On the other hand, alliances permit weaker states to restrict the action of stronger states. In sum, the German-Franco response is not anti-Americanism in the sense of hostility, but a refusal to accept United States leadership simply because it is the sole superpower. As

⁸⁵ Bürgerportal, "Landtagswahlen in Schleswig Holstein," <http://detlefmue.goto-my.de/portal-075/html/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=206> (accessed March 18, 2005).

⁸⁶ Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, 9.

⁸⁷ Patrick Tyler, U.S. Strategy Plans for Insuring No Rivals Develop A One-Superpower World, "New York Times, March 8, 1992, final edition.

my analysis of the European Security Strategy will show, Europe wants to establish its own right to act as a key player in world politics. Europe does not want to accept decisions pertaining to global peace or war if they are decided unilaterally in Washington. Taking into consideration these diverse interests, it is necessary to compare the basic security strategies of the United States and Europe to identify common interests.

C. A COMPARISON OF THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF AND THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY

The aim of this section is to compare the U.S. National Security Strategy (September 2002) and the European Security Strategy (8 December 2003). The United States of America is a nation at war against terrorism, and it is obvious that the incidents of 9/11 had a significant influence on its National Security Strategy (NSS). Furthermore, it may also be obvious to the reader that the basic differences between the NSS and the European Security Strategy (ESS) are the result of the two entities, divergent perceptions of the world. The NSS tends toward a realist view, while the ESS tends to reflect a more liberal view of the world. Although their individual threat perceptions are quite similar and their priorities are clear, the language of the two strategies is quite different. The NSS is generally more specific, its language reflects a determination to act. The ESS language tends to be more descriptive, but is sometimes vague or even ambiguous. While the tone of the NSS is more aggressive and prioritizes military action, the ESS favors diplomacy, political negotiation, and economic action, with military action being understood as a means of last resort. That is why Robert Kagan compressed the two approaches into the simple thesis that the Americans are tough Hobbesians and Europeans timid Kantian appeasers. “Americans are from Mars; Europeans are from Venus.”⁸⁸ Consequentially, he argued that it is time “to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world.”⁸⁹ Kagan’s explanation of the transatlantic situation, however, has proven to be inappropriate, as ongoing difficulties in overcoming post-war Iraq’s problems prove that, even in a globalized world, the United States needs Europe and vice versa. The EU High Representative for

⁸⁸ Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness,” *Policy Review*, no 113, June and July 2002, revised as the book: *Of Paradise and Power*, (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2003), 9.

the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Janvier Solana, put it simply: “Getting others to want what you want can be much more efficient in getting others to do what you want” and, in the process, proposed a marriage between Mars and Venus that could lead to the birth, as in the original myth, of the beautiful goddess Harmonia.⁹⁰

Another basic difference between the two strategies concerns the NSS global approach as compared to the ESS regional approach. Both strategies, however, emphasize the need to work together, as no single country possesses the ability to solve all of the world’s problems. The NSS can be read as a warning to all weak, non-cooperating and competing states to cooperate with the United States. The NSS is the initial Security Strategy that was completed with a framework of sub strategies, like homeland security, weapons of mass destruction, combating terrorism, cyberspace, critical infrastructure, protection, and drug control.⁹¹

In the next section I compare the NSS with the ESS along the lines of several categories, including threat perception, strategic objectives, international cooperation, (multilateralism, as well as unilateralism and the role of the United Nations), policy implications for Europe, and capabilities.

1. Threat Perception

As already mentioned, the United States and European security strategies share a number of similar views on the threats we all face. Both strategies describe the same basic challenges and threats for human beings in the twenty-first century. The ESS perceived threats explicitly in terms of “global challenges and key threats.”⁹² The wording seems to imply that Europe had always intended to act against “global

⁸⁹ Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness,” 11.

⁹⁰ Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, “Mars and Venus Reconciled: a New Era for transatlantic Relations”, April 7, 2003, <http://ue.eu.int/solana/list.asp?BID=107> in: Elisabeth Pond, *Friendly Fire: The near Death of the Transatlantic Alliance*, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 5 (accessed March 2, 2005).

⁹¹ Raphael Perl, ”U.S. Anti-Terror Strategy and the 9/11 Commission Report,” Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, February 4, 2005,” 2.

⁹² The Council of the European Union, “A Secure Europe in a Better World - The European Security Strategy,” http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.ASP?id=266&lang=EN&mode=g (accessed March 2, 2005).

challenges” like poverty and disease, AIDS, water scarcity, global warming, and migratory movements with economic measures.⁹³

Like the NSS, the ESS defines “terrorism” as an imminent global threat and stresses that terrorists “seek to undermine the openness and tolerance of Western societies.”⁹⁴ Both the NSS and ESS use an active approach in the fight against terrorism. The ESS stresses that “concerted European action is indispensable,”⁹⁵ but Europe is much less inclined to restrict individual rights in favor of preventive security measures. This can be explained by the slight cultural differences between the United States and Europe. As opposed to Europe, “the United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach.”⁹⁶ In terms of preemption, this means attacking terrorists worldwide and combating the growth of Islamic terrorism. There is no information in the ESS pertaining to transatlantic cooperation in the fight against terrorism.

The primary threat to the United States, according to the NSS, is acts of terrorism committed by transnational actors with global reach, supported by rogue states, and using WMD. In the ESS, WMD are identified as “potentially the greatest threat to the peace and security.”⁹⁷ In comparison with the NSS, this formulation seems vague. As mentioned in the introduction, the United States has developed a sub strategy that describes the three “pillars” of United States anti-WMD policy: “counterproliferation to combat WMD use”; “strengthened non-proliferation to combat WMD proliferation”; and “consequence management to respond to WMD use.”⁹⁸

⁹³ The Council of the European Union, “A Secure Europe in a Better World - The European Security Strategy,” 4-5.

⁹⁴ Javier Solana, “The European Security Strategy,” http://www.ueitalia2003.it/NR/rdonlyres/994663FB-368F-4562-9BF0-C7FE46E66F4C/0/1212DocSolanaStrategiaEuropea_en.pdf 3. (accessed March 3, 2005).

⁹⁵ The Council of the European Union, “A Secure Europe in a Better World - The European Security Strategy,” 5.

⁹⁶ The White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss3.html> 5. (accessed March 3, 2005).

⁹⁷ The Council of the European Union, “A Secure Europe in a Better World - The European Security Strategy,” 5. A European strategy against the proliferation of WMD was adopted by the European Council on December 12/2003. The strategy describes a roadmap for the fight against proliferation of WMD. The main area where the EU is concentrating its efforts are: Strengthening the international system of non-proliferation; Pursuing universalisation of multilateral agreements; Reinforcing strict implementation and compliance with these aims; Cooperating closely with the key-partners; Assistance to third countries.

⁹⁸ The White House, “U.S. Strategy to combat WMD,” <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss3.html>, (accessed March 3, 2005).

The NSS is more specific in its definitions of regions and their threats. Its approach is more global than that of the ESS, which conveys a more Eurocentric focus. The ESS mentions conflicts, like those in Kashmir, the Great Lakes Region, the Korean Peninsula, and the Middle East, as having a direct or indirect impact on European interests. In addition, the ESS mentions that the “most practical way to tackle the often elusive new threats will sometimes be to deal with the older problems of regional conflict.” Through the use of subtle hints, the ESS comments on the colonial heritage of many European countries, some of which still have colonial responsibilities that may be beneficial in resolving questions of regional security. Many of the addressed problems cannot be solved through military means, as their causes are often historically conditioned and deeply anchored.

Proposals for cooperation with African countries are outlined in great detail in the ESS, due to the colonial background of many European countries. The NSS appears biased in its support for Israel, identifying the Palestinians as the main aggressors in the Middle East and calling for them to “embrace democracy and the rule of law, confront corruption, and firmly reject terror.”⁹⁹ The ESS agrees that the Arab/Israeli conflict is the main problem in the Middle East, but takes no unequivocal stand.¹⁰⁰ In both strategies, state failure and weak states are described as the reason for regional instability and a source of terrorism and organized crime. Drafted after 9/11, the NSS shows the willingness of the United States to act against these global threats.¹⁰¹ Because “Europe is a prime target for organized crime,” these topics claim increased emphasis.¹⁰² Conflict prevention cannot start early enough, but, first and foremost, must begin with economical means.

⁹⁹ The White House, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” 9.

¹⁰⁰ The Council of the European Union, “A Secure Europe in a Better World - The European Security Strategy,” 10.

¹⁰¹ President George W. Bush infers that “The events of September 11/2001 taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states.” The White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” 2.

¹⁰² The Council of the European Union, “A Secure Europe in a Better World - The European Security Strategy,” 6.

The NSS outlines a basic global approach, while the basic approach contained in the ESS is limited to special regions of interest; however, the ESS pays more attention to “soft skills” outside the security-threat terms of reference.

2. Strategic Objectives

The ESS defines specific purposes for its strategic objectives. In the ESS, Europe’s responsibility for global security is vaguely formulated, but the strategy implies “that the first line of defense will often be abroad.”¹⁰³

The NSS espouses the right to act unilaterally, “before” an enemy is fully formed. Both strategies provide for a strategy of early intervention, but the ESS doesn’t describe the reason for or the type of intervention as clearly as the NSS. In addition, both strategies include an admission that no single country is able “to build a safer, better world alone,”¹⁰⁴ or, as the ESS expresses it, “No single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own.”¹⁰⁵

The NSS argues that those nations that are dependent on the United States ensuring international stability have the duty to cooperate with the United States to achieve that goal. The ESS, on the other hand, stresses that nations have to deal peacefully through common and international institutions.

The ESS offers a detailed description as to how international cooperation should work and how it should not work. One of Europe’s objectives is to develop a stronger international society, a society that would stand in direct opposition to the interests outlined in the NSS, by limiting potential United States courses of action. The ESS stresses that “regional conflicts need political solutions, but recognizes that military

¹⁰³ The Council of the European Union, “A Secure Europe in a Better World - The European Security Strategy,” 8.

¹⁰⁴ The White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” 1.

¹⁰⁵ The Council of the European Union, “A Secure Europe in a Better World - The European Security Strategy,” 3.

assets and effective policing may be needed in the post-conflict phase,”¹⁰⁶ missions for which the EU is well equipped and prepared.

The NSS consciously describes the necessity of coalitions of the willing; however, the last so-called coalition of the willing only served to split European nations over the issue of participation in the Iraq war.

3. International Cooperation

The ESS is unequivocal in its commitment to the United Nations charter. The European priority is to strengthen this institution and support it with all necessary means at its disposal. The aim is “an international order based on effective multilateralism.”¹⁰⁷ The NSS also states that the United States is committed to the United Nations, NATO, and other long lasting alliances, but “coalitions of the willing can augment these permanent institutions.”¹⁰⁸ In contradiction, the ESS stresses that the European nations must rely first on European and international institutions. The NSS recognizes the military legitimacy of NATO and its status as the strongest and most capable institution in the world, while simultaneously minimizing the EU’s role as an economic institution.¹⁰⁹

With respect to acceptance of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the NSS explicitly point out: “whose jurisdiction does not extend to Americans and which we do not accept.” Institutions like the ICC, which, in Europe, are recognized as trust-builders, are, from the United States perspective, seen as limiting. While both the NSS and the ESS acknowledge the need for international institutions, the United States retains the right of unilateral intervention when deemed necessary. The United States is also reluctant to join the ICC or the Kyoto Treaty due to fears that such participation would limit its scope of possible future action.

¹⁰⁶ The Council of the European Union, “A Secure Europe in a Better World - The European Security Strategy,” 8.

¹⁰⁷ The Council of the European Union, 11.

¹⁰⁸ The White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” 3.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, 26.

The NSS stresses that the United States needs support from its allies and friends with regard to intelligence, law enforcement, and the disruption of terrorist fighting, but European nations resent the notion of their being used as a “toolbox.” The U.S seems skeptical of EU defense efforts. In the NSS, NATO is recognized as the most capable European defense organization.

However, the aim addressed in the ESS is to be in “an effective and balanced partnership with the United States.” The ESS can be seen as confession for the continuation of good transatlantic relations.¹¹⁰

The ESS states that “We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary robust intervention,”¹¹¹ but it remains unclear what “intervention” means in this context. Does it mean military intervention like operation ARTEMIS in Congo, or deployments such as fact-finding missions, civil military observers, development aid, or other confidence-building measures?¹¹² The ESS fails to adequately outline circumstances that might warrant intervention.

4. Policy Implications

The ESS expresses a better model than the NSS for transatlantic coordination. Europe needs “to work with others,” but, outside the European engagement in NATO, the ESS addresses the need “to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention.”¹¹³

Both security strategies include consideration of preemptive action; however, in the ESS, the word is not “preemptive”, but rather “preventive.” The NSS stresses that

¹¹⁰ The Council of the European Union, “A Secure Europe in a Better World - The European Security Strategy,” 15.

¹¹¹ *Ibid*, 13.

¹¹² The European Union conducted within ESDP several operations, the following past Operations: EU Military Operation in former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (CONCORDIA), EU Military Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC/ ARTEMIS), and following current operations: EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR-ALTHEA), EU Police in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (PROXIMA), EU Rule Mission in Georgia (Ejust Themis), EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM), EU Police in Kinshasa (EUPOL-“Kinshasa”), http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.ASP?id=266&lang=EN&mode=g (accessed March 3, 2005).

¹¹³ The Council of the European Union, “A Secure Europe in a Better World - The European Security Strategy,” 13.

“the United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats,”¹¹⁴ but the United States does not hesitate to act unilaterally.

The ESS specifically addresses the question of efficient foreign policy to support proper coordination of military, economic, and political means to get the most efficient results and to avoid duplications. The ESS places primacy in achieving political solutions to international problems, augmented as necessary by military action and effective policing in the post-conflict phase. Therefore, Europe has to become more closely engaged with troubled countries. The NSS declares that the United States will not provide assistance to those who are unwilling or unready to help themselves.

5. Capabilities

Over the last few years, the capability debate¹¹⁵ has focused on the significant gap between Europe and the United States in terms of military expenditures. While the NSS describes a necessity to transform all major institutions of national security, the ESS stresses that “to transform our military into more flexible, mobile forces, and to enable them to address the new threats, more resources for defense and more effective use of resources is necessary.”¹¹⁶ The ESS rightly points this out and argues that the systematic use of pooled and shared assets would increase capabilities. Nevertheless, pooling defense assets is still a crucial point in the EU, because it is directly connected to the sovereignty of the member states.

It is, however, crucial to remember, that “a more capable Europe” is not only an issue of military capabilities. Europe’s prevention and post-war peace-building capabilities are also equally important. After each military intervention civilian reconstruction is necessary. The EU needs “a stronger diplomacy to combine the

¹¹⁴ The White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” 15.

¹¹⁵ At the Cologne European Council in June 1999, EU leaders agreed that the union must have the capacity for autonomous action. At the European Council meeting in Helsinki in December 1999 the so-called “Headline goal” was established. It included voluntarily cooperation in EU-led operations till 2003 and an agreement about new political and military structures. In May 2003 the Council confirmed that the EU has now operational capability across the whole range of Petersberg tasks. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of Information, 2001).

¹¹⁶ The Council of the European Union, “A Secure Europe in a Better World - The European Security Strategy,” 14.

resources of the member states with those of EU-institutions.”¹¹⁷ In today’s situation, it is not realistic to expect that economically hard-pressed governments in Europe will drastically increase defense spending. The more necessary it is to press ahead with “the systematic use of pooled and shared assets,” the more emphasis that must be placed on the output of money that is available.

Both strategies express a will to improve and to share intelligence with member states and partners. In respect to improved and shared intelligence, the ESS stresses that a “common threat assessment is the necessary basis for common actions.”¹¹⁸ Member states and partners are asked to participate. The argument is convincing, but the language of the ESS remains vague. The ESS indicates that the EU continues to be reliant on NATO for true defense. In the meantime, the EU-NATO permanent arrangements bridge the EU reliance on NATO.¹¹⁹ To amend this problem, the EU must be more committed to fill up its capability shortfalls.

6. Conclusion

The ESS is the European answer to the NSS; both strategies deal with many of the same issues. The structure of the ESS reflects a more general approach to those issues, while the NSS offers a more detailed plan of action, especially in terms of threat perception. That is why the ESS is regarded by the nations of the European Union as a much more serious document than its predecessors. But because of its vague language, it represents more a broad statement than a set of binding commitments. The EU may be a global player because of its economical strength, but it is not a global actor.

The ESS advances the idea of “civilian power” instead of “superpower,” with the view that European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) facilitates the EU acting “as a real civilian power in the world, that is to say as a force for the external promotion of

¹¹⁷ The Council of the European Union, “A Secure Europe in a Better World - The European Security Strategy,” 14.

¹¹⁸ Ibid, 14.

¹¹⁹ Ibid, 14. The Berlin Plus agreement gives the opportunity for EU-led operations to make use of NATO assets. The so called “Berlin Plus arrangements” cover three main elements that are directly connected to operations and which can be combined: EU access to NATO-planning, NATO-European command options and use of NATO assets and capabilities, <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-1%20Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf> (accessed March 3, 2005).

democratic principles.”¹²⁰ This is what Robert Kagan attempted to argue that the Europeans and the United States are, in effect, occupying different planets in regard to issues such as efficacy, morality, and the desirability of power.¹²¹ What is irritating for Kagan and his contemporaries is that the ESS expresses the determination of the European nations not to act, but to react, and to only use military means as a last resort. In both strategies, however, allowance is made for preemptive/preventive military action in extraordinary cases.

The United States feels it has an obligation to assume a leadership role in international relations. Because of its unique historical position as the world’s sole remaining superpower, this uncontested U.S. hegemony, is a welcome opportunity to shape the international microstructure.

Neither the NSS nor the ESS excludes preemptive/preventive military action, but, at its core, the NSS calls for the United States to use its “unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence” to establish a “balance of power that favors human freedom.”¹²² For the United States government the threat lies in a combination of terror, tyranny, and weapons of mass-destruction. Thus the NSS stresses that the combination of those three factors makes the security situation in the world more complex and dangerous.

Furthermore, the NSS focus is on states as key actors. This is one of the main differences between the NSS and the ESS. The NSS argues that international stability comes primarily from democratic states interacting peacefully with others, rather than through individual norms anchored in international institutions and law. This approach stands in marked contrast to the ESS.

The NSS is based on a dedicated faith in democracy a faith based, in turn, on American history and culture that their leaders will recognize the correct path and

¹²⁰ S. Stavridis, “Militarising the EU: The Concept of Civilian Power in Europe Revisited,” *The International Spectator* xxxvi, 4. (October – December 2001), 44.

¹²¹ Robert Kagan, *A Paradise of Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*. (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2003), 14.

¹²² The White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” 1.

embrace the opportunity for leadership. As a product of the Bush administration, the NSS lays out an approach that differs significantly from earlier strategies.¹²³

Both the NSS and the ESS begin with a threat assessment much different than those of the past. But they are similar in describing the threats and in recognizing current events, not as a clash of civilizations or a confrontation between powers that struggle to dominate world politics, but as a struggle between civilized states and uncivilized states, dominated politics, and chaos. The NSS paints the United States as a vulnerable society living under the scourge of an “imminent threat.” As such, it is obvious that this national strategy was written and ratified shortly after the incidents of 9/11.

The National Security Strategy of the United States and transformation of the United States forces stand in tight coherence. In the next section, therefore I explore the central question: What are the main differences between the “Weinberger Doctrine” and the newly adopted “Rumsfeld Doctrine” and how was this paradigm shift possible?

D. A PARADIGM SHIFT FROM THE “WEINBERGER DOCTRINE” TO TRANSFORMATION

Caspar Weinberger was the secretary of defense under the Reagan presidency (1981-89). Together with Colin Powell as his assistant, he developed the so-called “Weinberger doctrine,” based on lessons learned from the Vietnam war. Colin Powell was a Vietnam veteran and his influence on the Weinberger doctrine is obvious. As this section demonstrates, the “Weinberger doctrine” was largely influenced by Clausewitzian theories. But the enormous military and economical power of the United States, combined with the new sense of vulnerability after September 11, constrained United States policy makers and inspired them to act different. The idea of a sweeping and dramatic military transformation, the so-called “Rumsfeld Doctrine,” does anymore respect the principles of the “Weinberger Doctrine.” (This discussion may be especially interesting to those who believe that the primacy of politics is the supposition most essential to winning the war against terrorism without damaging democracy. I relate those ideas to examples from the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.)

¹²³ <http://www.dau.mil/pubs/arq/97arq/ranque.pdf> (accessed March 3, 2005).

The “Weinberger Doctrine” argued that engagement in war is necessary if the vital interests of the United States or its allies are at stake. The Weinberger approach was defensive, active only when necessary, and war was seen as a means of last resort. The current United States doctrine, the so-called “Rumsfeld Doctrine,” has a much more active approach. Preemptive and preventive military actions are seen as necessary to dissuade adversaries from adopting threatening capabilities, methods, and ambitions, on developing a particular key military advantage.¹²⁴ “Do everything you need to do first, taking as much time as you need. Then you can be certain of one thing: ultimate triumph. No matter how different the war proves to be.”¹²⁵ To achieve this goal the Department of Defense of the United States (DOD) tried to combine the military with other instruments of national power in a process called “interagency process.”¹²⁶

But what exactly does transformation mean here? “Transformation is a process that saves the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations, concepts, capabilities, people and organizations that exploit our nation’s advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world.”¹²⁷ Transformation is a modification of war. War is no longer the continuation of policy by *other* means, but by *all* means, including economical and information technology.

This doctrine was the basis for and the driving force behind the unilateral actions of the United States against Afghanistan and Iraq, where, because of the U.S. military superiority, there was no need for allies. This procedure has been conceived by some as “aggressive multilateralism,”¹²⁸ because so-called “partner” countries had no real choice. They had, and have to support the war against terrorism; otherwise they are supporters of terrorism according to President George W. Bush, who argues, that

¹²⁴ Department of Defense, “The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America,” March 2005.

¹²⁵ The basic tenets of this strategy are: High technology combat systems, reliance on the Air Force, small, nimble ground forces. The new America Foundation, “The Rumsfeld doctrine,” <http://www.newamerica.net/index.cfm?pg=article&DocID=613> (accessed March 16, 2005).

¹²⁶ Scott W. Moore, “Today it’s Gold, Not Purple” *Joint Force Quarterly*, No. 20 (Autumn/Winter 1998/1999) 100-105, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jq_pubs/1820.pdf (April 16, 2005).

¹²⁷ Transformation Planning Guidance, April 2003 (accessed December 16, 2004).

¹²⁸ Politikwissen.de, “Where do we go from here,” http://www.politikwissen.de/expertenforum/exp_brzezinski403.html (accessed March 16, 2005).

whoever is not with us, is against us. In the war against terrorism there can be no neutrality. But under President George Bush diplomacy worked differently. The first Gulf war enjoyed the benefit of great international consent and the legitimization of the United Nations. The legitimization from the U.S. Congress was the supposition to go to war. The primacy of policy was saved. In the case of the third Gulf War, George W. Bush acted reciprocally. With the support of the U.S. Congress, he was able to use the U.S. forces, without even the consent of the United Nations “to guard the national security against the constant threat of Iraq.”¹²⁹ This decision, however, lacked international support.

The Weinberger Doctrine points out that, if you decide to be militarily engaged, use all military means necessary to win the war. Clausewitz would argue in this case “that war is nothing other than the continuation of policy with other means.”¹³⁰ And if war is the continuation of policy, “there can be no question of a purely military evaluation of a great strategic issue nor a purely military scheme to solve it.”¹³¹

The current United States concept of military transformation, based on Secretary Rumsfeld’s modification of the Clausewitzian theory that “war is the continuation of policy with other means,” is dangerous. If war in the twenty-first century is fought with no “other” means than “all” means, then policy is subordinated to the desire to prevail. Today’s U.S. policy developments are aimed at the continuation of the war against terrorism. But who controls this process and what is the standard of victory or defeat? It seems the primacy of policy is not respected.

Furthermore, the Weinberger Doctrine argues that political and military objectives must be clearly defined. “Clausewitz stressed planning a campaign clearly through to completion in order to achieve political objectiveness including creating military conditions that would facilitate negotiations.”¹³² He also cautioned against “overshooting

¹²⁹ Joint Resolution 46 of the U.S. Congress to authorize the use of United States Forces against Iraq, October 2, 2002.

¹³⁰ Carl von Clausewitz, “Note of July 1827”, *On War*, 69. Emphasis in original, in: Peter, Paret, ed. *The Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton: University Press, 1986), 197.

¹³¹ *Ibid*, 200.

¹³² Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: University Press, 1976), 579.

the target” in military operations. In Iraq, combat planning was in the foreground while the endstate deliberations planning for the situation after the war, became merely part of the background.

The assumption that, after a victory over the Saddam Hussein regime, the establishment of democracy and peace would occur automatically was wrong. Liberty and order are conditions that need cooperative measures. They cannot be achieved violently. The inclusion of potential post-war situations in deliberations during the planning phase of a war is absolutely essential.

Like Clausewitz, the Weinberger doctrine argues that political and military objectives must be continually reassessed. Therefore, “each regional commander in chief (CINC) should have a standing interagency team to act as an operations transition planning cell. This element must include members well versed in the application of the military, diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power.”¹³³ Many have long argued, even before the war, that the U.S. administrations plans for rebuilding Iraq were inadequate and were based on overly optimistic assumptions that Americans would be greeted as liberators. Now, at worst, the conditions in Iraq could change to a civil war. How could this misjudgment happen?

As the Weinberger Doctrine advises only incur liabilities if you have the support of your own population. Clausewitz would argue that the unity of politics, the military, and the population (trinity) is a necessary precondition to going to war. The political leadership must not only have a goal that the army will try to achieve, but also the population has to support the war.

The Weinberger Doctrine describes war as the last means. While Clausewitz also describes war as the last means of politics, the war in Afghanistan and in Iraq in terms of the warlords changed to a war in principle. The “Rumsfeld Doctrine” includes explicit preventive warfare as is expressed in the motto: “do everything you need to do first, taking as much time as you need.”¹³⁴ In the U.S. war against terrorism, the war has been

¹³³ John R. Boule, JFQ Autumn/Winter, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1929.pdf (accessed March 16, 2005).

¹³⁴ Scott W. Moore, “Today it’s Gold, Not Purple” *Joint Force Quarterly*, No. 20 (Autumn/Winter 1998/1999) 100-105, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1820.pdf (April 16, 2005).

promoted as a panacea of policy. The lack of diplomacy and negotiations, the lack of a stable Western great alliance able to coordinate economic and development aid, are the reason why the strategy in Iraq has not been successful. Because it can rely on its military technological superiority, the United States obviously prefers to achieve a successful outcome in conflicts prevailing with violent means. In contrast the militarily weakly armed European states see themselves as mainly civil powers and are unready to risk war, rather than other means.

E. CONCLUSION

In the preceding discussions I suggest that there were specific circumstances leading to a deep crisis in the transatlantic relations. It is revealing how small the commonalities seem when important, not merely rhetorical, decisions have to be made. In determining when and under what circumstances to go to war issue the United States and Europe take irreconcilable positions. But Europe itself also divided on this issue. The European Security Strategy attempts to verbalize a common accepted position. That is why its language is vague in regard critical questions.

However, it is hard to believe that the Weinberger Doctrine has been made obsolete by the Rumsfeld Doctrine. The principles of Clausewitz and the Weinberger doctrine are still valid. American self-confidence in dealing with power is not new, but the United States definition of the international order is. The painfully experienced vulnerability of United States on September 11 and the new capabilities to be acquired to the military transformation left its stamp on today's U.S. foreign policy. The war against terrorism is fought without compromise. A peaceful coexistence with terrorists is impossible. Therefore, the United States is looking for allies with the same "with-us-or-against-us-ideology." This strategy splits the Western world and weakens the world's most successful alliance and its fight against terrorism. Europe does not want to accept that decisions about global peace or war are decided unilaterally in Washington, especially when those decisions are presented through a neoconservative Bush government as part of the doctrine of military preemption. As Paul Berman argues the postwar order should be based on "Embracing common liberal democratic norms and

operating within interlocking multilateral institutions.”¹³⁵ Transformation breaks with that tradition and can be seen as one of the key factors in the deterioration of the transatlantic relations.

¹³⁵ Paul Berman, p. 85.

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IV. THE NEW EUROPEAN UNION

A. THE FUTURE OF EUROPE

European economical cooperation after WWII started with the Montan union. It was founded on April 18th, 1951, by France, Italy, the Benelux countries, and the Federal Republic of Germany.¹³⁶ The Montan union can be seen as the germ cell of the European Union (EU). Since the EU's foundation in 1957, Germany and France have been the core nations.¹³⁷ In January 2003, German chancellor Gerhard Schröder met in Paris with French president Jacques Chirac to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the Franco-German Elysée Treaty (1963), which has a strict bilateral character.¹³⁸ There can be no doubt that each state is an important partner to the other, which is exactly what both states have affirmed over the course of the years. They have proved to be the main engine of enlargement in the European Union. In the light of the new global threats, cooperation between the two countries is now of special importance to the Union, especially in the field of security policies. France, in reasserting "its desire to strengthen its relationship with Germany, had suggested to raising its military collaboration with its eastern neighbor to a European level."¹³⁹ The question remains, however, do both states actually act cooperatively, with one voice?

In the specific case concerning decisions about the third Iraq war, their intra state cooperative action was a reality. In terms of European policies, both states suggested a European security and defense union with a majority principle, with responsibility for assistance and common planning. This decision was facilitated by the favorable relations

¹³⁶ Deutscher Bundestag, *Frage an die Deutsche Geschichte: Ideen, Kräfte, Entscheidungen von 1800 bis zur Gegenwart* (Bonn: Bundesdruckerei, 1993), 376.

¹³⁷ The head of governments of the Montan union signed the 1957 treaty of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). Deutscher Bundestag, 380.

¹³⁸ Ludolf Herbst, *Option für den Westen: Vom Marshallplan bis zum deutsch-französischen Vertrag*, (München: DTV, 1989), 203.

¹³⁹ Jean-Yves Haine, *ESDP: An overview* (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 1.

between the two ruling governments, which have never been as good as they seem to be today. Before 1998, these relationships seemed disturbed, and the European “motor” more likely to stutter and stall.¹⁴⁰

Despite the most recent swell in European cooperation, questions remain concerning Europe’s enduring interest in achieving a common security and defense policy and their ability to maintain these mutual interests over time. We must also consider the possibility that France sees the European Union as a means to an end: a simple tool to be manipulated in an attempt to achieve national aims they would be unable to realize on their own due to their relative weakness in relation to their European neighbors. France has long perceived itself as a counterweight to the United States in Europe, as the French minister for foreign affairs Hubert Védrine stressed in 1998: “we cannot accept a unipolar political world and therefore we will fight for a multipolar world.”¹⁴¹

Is European policy a detour for countries` other aims or a real mutual project and a permanent interest? For Germany, the decisive issue will be how France, its closest partner in the European security policy environment, will approach and handle European security. In addition how the European Union addresses the question of war or peace will not only influence security throughout Europe, but also in the greater world. According to this argument, France will attempt to influence, and infuse its own national interests into, the European Union’s security and defense policies.¹⁴²

B. GERMAN INTERESTS

The Federal Republic of Germany’s core politic are as follows: First, the welfare of the population; second, liberty, democracy, and human rights; and third, security.¹⁴³ Since Konrad Adenauer (1949-1963), the basis of federal German foreign policy has

¹⁴⁰ Jean-Marc Trouille, “The Franco-German Axis since Unification,” in *France from the Cold War to the New World Order*, ed. Tony Chafer and Brian Jenkins (New York: St. Martins Press, 1996), 58.

¹⁴¹ Matthias Rüb. *Der Atlantische Graben: Amerika und Europa auf getrennten Wegen* (Wien: Paul Zsolnay Verlag, 2004), 49.

¹⁴² Janet Bryant, “Changing Circumstances, Changing Policies? The 1994 Defense White Paper and Beyond,” in *France from the Cold War to the New World Order*, ed. Tony Chafer and Brian Jenkins (New York: St. Martins Press, 1996), 91.

¹⁴³ Axel Lüdeke, *Europäisierung der deutschen Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik*, Opladen 2002, 126.

been and continues to be the desire for close connections with the United States, to reconcile historical disputes with France, and to increase European integration.¹⁴⁴ These interests must be examined in conjunction with the influence of decisive historical experiences which have influenced the German political system. After World War II, the foreign policy of the German Federal Republic was greatly restricted due to the burden of National Socialist crimes, the limited sovereignty imposed by the occupation forces after the war, the nation's division into two states, and the Republic's integration into supranational organizations.¹⁴⁵ Neutralism was seen as a revival of the German *Sonderweg* and hence declined.¹⁴⁶

Under these restrictions, only one German foreign and security policy could be adopted with a hope of success: permanent self-restraint, combined with the abandonment of sovereignty. In simple terms, the Federal Republic adopted a policy of multilateralism in order to forward its interests and reach its aims. By means of multipolar integration and cooperation on the international stage, it was able to regain international trust despite occurrences before 1945. The basic German law prescribes a policy of candid and cooperative internationalism in to further particular European integration. Even after Germany's reunification, these aims have not changed.¹⁴⁷ Germany does not want to be a dominant power in Europe; instead, it favors a policy of self-restraint and multilateral power. Germany wants to be “a major power but not a great one.”¹⁴⁸

1. Security Policy

Kirchner argues that after WWII “the Federal Republic of Germany acquired a phobia against the use of force as an instrument of foreign policy, sought its identity

¹⁴⁴ Jeffrey Herf. *War by Other Means: Soviet Power, West German Resistance, and the Battles of the Euromissiles* (New York: Free Press, 1991), 15.

¹⁴⁵ Gregor Schöllgen, “Deutschland an der Schwelle zum 21. Jahrhundert: Gibt es noch eine deutsche Interessenpolitik?” *FüAk-aktuell* 2/1998, 2.

¹⁴⁶ Jeffrey Herf, 16.

¹⁴⁷ Renata Fritsch-Bournazel, *Europe and the German Unification*. (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1992), 215.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid, 210.

within European and Atlantic multilateral structures, and until unification found the term ‘national interest’ disquieting.”¹⁴⁹

Even today, Germany follows a strict security policy of integration,¹⁵⁰ aiming to link state power and military power into a network of mutually supportive organizations. Security is achieved through far-reaching, decentralized powers and the leverage of power against influence on other participants, by means of bilateral contracts (e.g., with France), and multilateral coalitions (e.g., EU, OSZE, VN) and confederations (e.g., NATO). Because of Germany’s geographic position in central Europe, the unique historical experience, the threats of the international system, the constraints of constitutional law, and established institutions like the EU and NATO, as well as German-French cooperation, the federal Republic will continue to be a member of multilateral organizations. ESDP goes even further Germany is deeply interested in, and pushing for, a more Europeanized security policy. The German EU presidency helped to change the European defense identity into a European security and defense policy.¹⁵¹

2. European Policy

German European policy was designed to pursue core German interests while Germany integrated itself as a peaceful partner with the Western nations (*westintegration*), and to reach reconciliation with France in order to contain it within the overriding European order. As already mentioned, an indispensable module at the bilateral level is the Elysée Treaty with France of January 22, 1963.¹⁵² Multilaterally, European integration is most important for Germany, as this kind of integration not only important has European aims but also is especially conducive to Germany’s economical and national self-interest. As its long-term goal, therefore, Germany is interested in the maintenance of, deeper integration with, and multinational cooperation within the European framework, like all the other member states, because of the inherent political

¹⁴⁹ Stephen Philip Kramer. “Does France Still Count?: The French Role in the New Europe,” The Washington Papers/164, Westport 1994, 27.

¹⁵⁰ Ludolf Herbst, 96.

¹⁵¹ Jean-Yves Haine, 3.

¹⁵² Deutscher Bundestag, *Fragen an die Deutsche Geschichte: Ideen, Kräfte, Entscheidungen von 1800 bis zur Gegenwart*. Bonn, 1993, 375.

and economical interdependencies.¹⁵³ This also includes the so-called “enlargement” interest in the involvement of East European states.¹⁵⁴

Success will be possible if, and only if, Germany is able to avoid countervailing power multilaterally and bilaterally to fulfill its constitutional guidelines and to influence the outcome of European policy. This would be not possible as a separatist.

C. FRENCH INTERESTS

French foreign policy reflects core interests similar to those of Germany. However, France does not operate on the basis of “Realpolitik,” but on a political-cultural basis of the “Gaullism” of the fifth French Republic. As Phillip Gordon expresses it, “The Gaullist years may not represent an entirely new era in the history of France, but in a number of ways, they set a standard of continuity and change.”¹⁵⁵ This argument is based on three pillars. First, “Grandeur”¹⁵⁶ which derives from France’s historical and cultural global size and its rank in the international system. Second, “Indépendence,”¹⁵⁷ derived from France’s national independence and autonomy and sovereign French decisions; and third, “État nation,”¹⁵⁸ meaning nation-state acting as a protagonist in the international system. Gordon gets to the heart of French policy when he stresses that “the belief in France’s universal mission often appeared to others as just the sort of hegemonic pretension of which the superpowers were accused by de Gaulle himself de Gaulle’s Europe of states would fall under French hegemony in the same way an Atlantic Europe fell under American it also implied a hierarchization of nation-states, with France, naturally, at or near the top.”¹⁵⁹ France wants Europe to have maximum autonomy from United States domination. This basic persuasion can be seen in the historical and cultural coinages of French policy, consisting of revolutionary values, societal crises, lost wars,

¹⁵³ Ludolf Herbst, 232.

¹⁵⁴ Renata Fritsch-Bournazel, 228.

¹⁵⁵ Philip H. Gordon, *A Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), 5.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid, 18.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid, 18.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid, 20.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid, 19.

a number of invasions, colonial experiences, former great-power status, permanent membership in the UN Security Council, and French nuclear weapons. These ideas are sustained, even in periods of “cohabitation” by all political encampments¹⁶⁰ and are aimed at the enlargement of French influence, to reclaim their great-power status.

1. Security Policy

France follows a security policy based on its sovereignty, and the above mentioned French convictions determine foreign policy decisively. Security without influence through foreign powers is solely feasible by strict autonomy and delimitation from other actors. The sustaining pillars of the French security policy are accordingly nation-state-centric and are aimed at defending France from foreign influences, for example by the use of nuclear deterrence, the Force de Frappe (FdF) and by power projection (intervention, airplane carrier). Thus, France seeks multipolarity and the enforcement of the law of nations; unilateral action, as a basic principle, is disclaimed. Till the end of the cold war, France wanted to realize three main goals:¹⁶¹ the involvement of Germany in European tasks, the linking of the United States with Europe, and the containment of the Soviet influence. In relation to the basic conviction of “independence,” France established a demand for nuclear weapons and a special position in NATO, as well as an unavoidable European defense identity. French politicians try to maintain this even today.

2. European Policy

In de Gaulle’s European policy of the fifth French Republic, the following principles had priority: first, security with and against Germany; second, European policy, which was first and foremost a policy about Germany; and third, France’s need to protect itself against Germany. France was able to gain influence only with Germany

¹⁶⁰ “The French people are certainly not the only ones who believe they produce values which are applicable to all humanity: but they have implanted this universalism at the very heart of their national ideology. The French revolution, while defending the territory of the Republic, also meant to bring enlightenment to the world.” Dominique David, “The Search for a New Security Strategy in a Shifting International Arena,” in *France from the Cold War to the New World Order*, eds. Tony Chafer and Brian Jenkins. (New York: St. Martins Press, 1996), 66.

¹⁶¹ Stephen Philip Kramer, 89.

toward other “poles.”¹⁶² In all, the German influence was not allowed to get overly strong because this would have endangered the French position. The Elysée treaty (1963) gives an impression of the fine-tuning of this relation.¹⁶³

Today the political situation is different, even though French interests have not changed. Germany has been reunified for more than fifteen years and has a strong economic and political potential. Today it is obvious that the interests of France’s security policy can be achieved most likely within Europe, with a consistent French European policy defining its interests in a more adaptive way, while still retaining its same traditional approach focused on functional interests:¹⁶⁴

- A union of European states has to be created,
- with Germany and France at its core,
- equally allied with United States,
- with a targeted common global foreign policy,
- with France in the leading role because of its global weight.

These goals have been widely repeated and affirmed by relevant French political actors in recent years. Correspondingly, France sees itself as the kernel of a future west European great power. The vision of speaking with one Europeans voice means, nonetheless, not to weaken member states. Hardly ever the own state.

D. FRENCH EUROPEAN POLICY SINCE 1945

To understand European policy within the French political system, it is important to analyze the intertwining of domestic and foreign policy. Frances foreign policy refers to Germany, the former Soviet Union, and various former imperial holdings, as well as its relationships with United States and NATO. In addition we must also consider the conditions of the constitution of the Fifth French Republic: the competencies of the

¹⁶² Stephen Philip Kramer, 30.

¹⁶³ The Elysée treaty was never fully implemented, because of the German fear of offending NATO by flirting with France. Contents were the rapprochement of military doctrines, regular meetings of defense ministers (every three month), personnel exchanges between the each countries` armed forces, armaments cooperation, and cooperation in civil defense. Philip H. Gordon, 126.

¹⁶⁴ Henri Froment-Maurice, *Une politique étrangère pour quoi faire?* *Politique étrangère* 2000, 320.

president, the electoral system, and the national economic situation. To discuss the fifth Republic's structure, I divided it according to phases to its presidency.

After 1945, during the fourth Republic under President de Gaulle, France opted for a more Western orientation and a European-defined security policy with Germany as its core interests. Therefore, early on, France was willing to hand over national sovereignty in favor of a European organization. France agreed with the European Community treaties (1957), and de Gaulle launched, with the beginning of the fifth French Republic, a European initiative in which Germany would play a decisive role. However, in 1954, the European military alliance (EDC) failed because of domestic political resistance. In 1966, France decided to leave the integrated military structure of NATO, and, with the subsequent domestic unrests of 1968, the French European vision for a "Europe from the Atlantic to the Ural"¹⁶⁵ failed. The Soviet invasion in the CSSR (1968) to quell civil uprising influenced French policy as well.

Under President Pompidou, French European policy gave priority to economic issues, with a reinforced attempt at engagement within Europe, for example, the policy of détente and the international strengthening of the international role of Europe. It was determined, therefore, that European states would harmonize their economic and foreign policies.

President Giscard d'Estaing found himself in an advantageous political situation: the United States was preoccupied with the Watergate crisis (1972-1974), Great Britain was not interested in deeper European integration, and Germany had a new government. The chance for active political formation was there.¹⁶⁶ On the one hand, Giscard d'Estaing stressed improving France's ties with the United States and NATO because he feared Europe would move too quickly toward an independent defense. On the other hand, he did more for the building of European Institutions than all his predecessors.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁵ Philip H. Gordon, 186.

¹⁶⁶ Jeffrey Herf, *War by Other Means: Soviet Power, West German Resistance, and the Battle of Euromissiles* (New York: Free Press, 1991), 45.

¹⁶⁷ Giscard d'Estaing did more for Europe than his predecessors. Emphasized must be his engagement in building European institutions, like the European Council, the European Monetary System, a directly elected European Parliament, and European Political Cooperation (EPC). Philip H. Gordon, 99.

Within the European economic integration and increasingly dense relations between France and Germany, the idea of a European federation, increased self-reliance, and a common security policy was born.

The European concepts of President Mitterand (1981) and his socialist government included recommendation of a stronger role for France in both Europe and the greater world, as well as a special relationship with Germany, because the circumstances surrounding France's security policy had fundamentally changed. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the retrofit of SS-20 missiles targeted at western Europe convinced France's Socialist government "to adopt a firmer stand on the question of defense the Cold War was back, and the French wanted to help fight it."¹⁶⁸ In response, France postulated a European defense area with more responsibility for the west-Europeans. There is no doubt that the new approach toward NATO was combined with an insistence on national independence from NATO.

Since 1995, the "neo-gaullist" President Chirac has maintained the existing security policy interests. His European security policy includes NATO, while trying to avoid conflicts with partners, especially the United States. The basic convictions of the French foreign and security policies have permeated through all phases of the French security policy. I turn now to an exploration of how France has turned those convictions into reality.

1. France's Rank in the World – Leadership in and with Europe

At its center, France's European policy has been driven by an overriding desire to regain and maintain France's lost status as a great power. De Gaulle knew that by cooperating with the other European states, France was more likely to achieve its desired leading role. French governments after the end of World War II tried to use western European institutions and their own security structures to strengthen France's overall power. To this end, it was first necessary for France to establish itself as a leader in Europe, to gain greater influence within the international system, to gain national weight and grandness, and to become a decisive power. Europe would play a role as well, but as

¹⁶⁸ Philip H. Gordon, 111.

a compensative element, as a Western power in the East-West Conflict. After France's loss of power at the close of World War II we can identify three phases of France's political policies. First, France transferred its national ambitions onto partners in order to locate France under their overarching leadership as "global players." In the next phase, cooperation within NATO was stressed in order to build support for a later move toward creating reinforced European security structures. France was thereby generally poised to cooperate within NATO, because it represented the only way to garner control and influence and potentially inhibit and prevent the European unification process. Gordon concludes that "the final attraction of a European security identity for French leaders seems to be as a tool for achieving French influence both within the alliance and throughout the world."¹⁶⁹

In 1994, a French Defense White Paper described France's desire to reinstitute itself as a world power and further its position in the new world-power structure,¹⁷⁰ or at least draw France level with the United States's perception of worldwide interests. At this point, "grandeur" and "indépendence" find themselves merged into a single policy. The most recent French governments accepted the premise that an enlarged, and, in terms of a security policy, a relevant Europe would need a bigger leadership group – not precluding that France could take over the leadership position within this group.

2. Indépendence – ESDP to Balance the Hegemon

Since the time of De Gaulle, constant characteristics of French European policy have been an insistence on self-contained European foreign and security policies and to a clear differentiation of Europe as a whole from the United States. The French government have managed this by means of limited political conflicts, with no attempt to challenge the common nuclear security.¹⁷¹ France is only able to substantiate itself as a world power when acting collectively with its European neighbors. And because France needs a European power base to facilitate its world-power role, it is only able to achieve this aim

¹⁶⁹ Philip H. Gordon, 177.

¹⁷⁰ Dominique David, "The Search for a New Security Strategy in a Shifting International Arena," in *France from the Cold War to the New World Order*, ed. Tony Chafer and Brian Jenkins (New York: St. Martins Press, 1996), 72.

¹⁷¹ Philip H. Gordon, 5.

if American hegemony is reduced in Europe. Therefore, a transatlantic framework was a necessary precondition of a privileged French position within western Europe, as was cooperation with France's partners with no loss of independence and the possibility of an independent western Europe. This was, in the first instance, dependent on the nuclear armament situation in the world. In the 1970s, European policies dead ended because of the détente policy and disarmament. In the 1980s, security and defense cooperation with Germany were intensified for two reasons. France wanted either to create an autonomous European option or to build a European "alliance within an alliance," within NATO, to gain more influence over the preservation of France's special status.¹⁷² France chose several options in the 1990s, but continued to follow its guidelines in the question of European politics: to reduce the influence of the United States in Europe, to slow down the European enlargement process, and to preserve France's national identity.¹⁷³

With the end of the Cold War, several observers saw a chance to renew unfulfilled "Gaullist" visions. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, finding itself facing a unified Germany, France determined that new measures had to be taken: "the French have decided that the only way they can continue to play a leadership role in Europe – and that Europe can play a global role – is by sacrificing a measure of national independence on the altar of European integration."¹⁷⁴ Today it seems that France wants to limit the role of the United States, at least in Europe, and also to contain the newly reunified Germany within Europe. The concept of European strategic autonomy might then be conceivable within European Security and Defense Policy as the European pillar of NATO; however, this fails to fully explain French interest in pushing the development of European security and defense policies. With the German reunion, the old bilateral balance of power between France and Germany was disturbed. The only way open to the French, if they were unable to "contain" their powerful neighbor, would be to "embrace" him and bind him to themselves, and as effectively as possible, into the network of

¹⁷² Janet Bryant, "Changing Circumstances, Changing Policies? The 1994 Defense White Paper and Beyond," in *France from the Cold War to the New World Order*, eds. Tony Chafer and Brian Jenkins (New York: St. Martins Press, 1996), 81.

¹⁷³ Ibid, 73.

¹⁷⁴ Stephen Philip Kramer, 94.

European legislation.¹⁷⁵ Special trust-building arrangements between France and Germany were aimed at enhancing institutionalized monetary cooperation by, for example the European Monetary System in 1979, the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, and the Monetary Union in 2002.¹⁷⁶

In the past, French interests had caused several conflicts with their European partners.¹⁷⁷ Some French ideas about European autonomy within NATO failed; therefore a consensus of European nations was required. Their first preferred option for an independent European defense failed because of the special status of the “Force de Frappe,” the different security policy interests, and the definition of transatlantic relations. Recently however, with the Chirac government in power, France’s approach to NATO has become more visible. Certain discernments emerged under the political influence of the second Gulf War, the requirement for a “new world order” and, therefore, different force structures. France’s approach should ensure French influence and the control (autonomously in the future) of European security structures, which can be built with NATO, but not against NATO. However, already Chirac has implied that this European pole of defense “would somehow eventually replace NATO as the organization responsible at least for defending Europe.”¹⁷⁸

3. État Nation – Intergovernmental Cooperation

Certainly, France was only interested in political cooperation between governments, not a supranational integration. Economic European integration supports French interests, but not the integration of security policies or military forces.¹⁷⁹ After the end of the Cold War, it was commonly expected that the French European-policy debate

¹⁷⁵ Philip H. Gordon, 175.

¹⁷⁶ The Council of the European Union, A comprehensive guide through European law, http://europa.eu.int/pol/emu/index_en.htm (accessed March 15, 2005).

¹⁷⁷ Stephen Philip Kramer, 30.

¹⁷⁸ Peter Fysh, “Gaullism and the New World Order,” in *France from the Cold War to the New World Order*, eds. Tony Chafer and Brian Jenkins (New York: St. Martins Press, 1996), 185.

¹⁷⁹ Robert O. Paxton, *Europe in the Twentieth Century*, 4th ed. (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing, 2004), 548.

about independence versus integration would come to an end, including separation from “Gaullism,” and that France would try to find equilibrium between nation-states and a supranational structure.

Since, the policy of de Gaulle a “Europe of the Fatherlands” was in the special interest of France. The initiative of Giscard d’Estaing attached greater importance to common foreign and security policies. In 1974 the “European Council,” an assembly of the heads of government, was founded. Unfortunately this council was not used as a European-community organ, but as an autonomous carrier of national state sovereignty. In the engaged era of Mitterand and with the cognition to gain more weight within Europe and only with Europe in the world the EPZ (later GASP) was strengthened. The dualism between common (European) economic and domestic policies and intergovernmental foreign and security policies have to be examined separately, at least from the viewpoint of the relevant political French actors. Since 1981, within Mitterand’s incumbency there was a minor deviation, from the principle of continuity, to reject any deprivation of national power to the advantage of the EU.

If the European Union wants to be a relevant, global political actor, it must be able and willing to act with or without NATO. This is not likely to be manageable if decisions are more dependent on intergovernmental than on integrative cooperation. The European constitution, when ratified by all EU member countries at the end of 2005, should help to solve this problem.

E. FRENCH-GERMAN RELATIONS

Until 1989, in terms of French-German relations, France was more responsible for foreign policy; Germany was more responsible for an economic policy with regard to a common European policy.¹⁸⁰ The French foreign policy facing Germany can be divided into several phases. The preparation for a French-German bilateral relationship, began with the European Council treaties. De Gaulle’s initiative deepened the relationship with the Elysée treaty (1963), which excluded common cooperative security and defense policies. Next came a more passive phase, caused by the German “Ostpolitik” and policy

¹⁸⁰ Jean-Marc Trouille, “The Franco German Axis since Unification,” in *France from the Cold War to the New World Order*, eds. Tony Chafer and Brian Jenkins (New York: St. Martins Press, 1996), 55.

of détente (1963-1969).¹⁸¹ France was interested in the preservation of the status quo in terms of German partition and the “Westbindung.”¹⁸² Favorable German relations with eastern European states and French abstinence from NATO rigidified France’s interest in a German integration. Germany was interested in reintegrating France into NATO. As a result, negotiations by both countries, in 1989, resulted in the reactivation of a “privileged bilateral relationship” that focused on security and defense policies.¹⁸³ In the subsequent two years, France put forward several proposals that, at the end, described a “true security policy that would ultimately lead to a common defense.”¹⁸⁴

Since 1990, relations between the countries have become more normalized. Germany has gained even more influence in terms of security policies since its reunification, giving both countries more confidence in mutual cooperation and negotiations. With respect to European integration, both countries have resolved their various internal conflicts as well. One example was the EU summit in Nice, where advantages in favor of Germany were contractually documented in the voting patterns of the European council and the parliament.¹⁸⁵ It’s obvious that French desires for European autonomy stood in direct opposition to Germany’s realization of favored transatlantic relations, a dilemma that influenced French-German security cooperation from the beginning.

So far, there has been no real possibility of winning German support as a partner for an autonomous Europe. Due to the West European Union (WEU) – the old desire for European defense – and despite the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, there has been no other viable alternative for France except to use NATO to secure its influence over Germany, in Europe, and in the world. The interests of both countries converge in NATO and the EU, where they work to decrease their strategic dependence on the United States. However, this means that both countries, especially Germany, will be dependent on

¹⁸¹ Philip H. Gordon, 65.

¹⁸² David Calleo, 167.

¹⁸³ Renata Fritsch-Bournazel, 172.

¹⁸⁴ Philip H. Gordon, 172.

¹⁸⁵ Germany and France got 29 (so far 10) votes in the European Council. In the European parliament Germany got, with respect to the population, 99 seats and France only 72 (so far 87). Daniel Colard, Le partenariat franco-allemand dix ans après la chute de mur: 1990-2000, *Défense nationale* 57 (2001), 7, 44-54.

ESDP, which continues to evolve very slowly. The European political union and a stronger WEU were formally accepted at Maastricht, but several nations, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Portugal, for example, still believe that “European efforts should remain under NATO’s umbrella.”¹⁸⁶ Common foreign and security policies remained the only intergovernmental pillar of the European Union.

The draft of the European constitution, which has yet be ratified by the EU member states, appears to be big step forward in direction of ESDP. Article I-12 of the EU constitution includes provisions outlining the Union’s cooperation in matters of common foreign and security policies. They will cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union’s security, as well as a progressive framing of common defense policies.¹⁸⁷ Due to the principal of unanimity, however, each member state also retains the right to veto, corresponding with the French paradigm of sovereignty. Despite all its declarations, France remains firm on its stance concerning autonomy. At the same time, until very recently, the German principle of multinational fixation on its own foreign and security policies failed to gain support.

Since Maastricht, the French-German initiatives for ESDP have set their collective sights on an ambitious aim. Over the course of the various debates concerning federalism that occurred between 1999 and 2002, French-German differences have become clear. Commonalties as to the role of the national state, the conception of European tasks generally, and the global role of Europe leave no doubt about their different interests in a federally organized Europe. Both states support a federal structure, but France does not accept the German approach of a real European government and an upgrade of the European parliament, because this would weaken the European council and its various member states.

F. CONCLUSION

The previous chapters have demonstrated that France’s statecraft and its security-policy interests share a common history. These primarily Gaullist interests are the

¹⁸⁶ Philip H. Gordon, 173.

¹⁸⁷ The European Convention, “Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe,” <http://european-convention.eu.int/DraftTreaty.asp?lang=EN> (accessed February 18, 2005).

functional basis of France's security-oriented European policy. After World War II, France's relations with Germany – soon its closest European partner – showed differences, sometimes conflicts. Even today the conflicts between integration with other nations and self-integration remain a problem. French policies are good examples of how an autonomous defense can be combined with the willingness to cooperate.

It would be faulty, however, to believe that Europe can be organized without the abandonment of sovereignty. France's desire to be a weighty strategic protagonist in a multipolar world has its price. Gaullist policies were implemented (as described in Chapter II) at a time when the United States dominated the Atlantic alliance, the Soviet threat hung heavily over a bipolar world, the Europeans were not able to defend themselves and had basic disagreements among themselves. All these factors are changing, or have already changed, and French policies have changed as a result. Further development of the European unity seems to be the most promising way to overcome traditional models of strategic order in a globalized world; however, these are not adequate to the tasks facing Europe in the multipolar reality of the new world order. This is surely true for the French basic convictions *état nation* and *indépendence*. *Grandeur* (rank) could be conserved in cooperation with the France's European neighbors, because only in conjunction with its neighbors is France able to exercise the influence it claims for itself. The time of the importance of *force de frappe*, and the policy of the “empty chair,” is obviously over. Not long ago, France was able to influence world policy directly. From now on, France will try to extend its influence at the expense of Europe as a whole. Through its influence and control over European foreign and security policies, France is able to exercise coleadership. But NATO membership under the leadership of another great power and participation in ad-hoc alliances¹⁸⁸ as an unattached global protagonist is not a realistic option for France.¹⁸⁹ With a “European pole of defense” in

¹⁸⁸ France is poised to take part in ad-hoc coalitions if its structural interests like multilateralism and the law of nations are considered. The participation of French forces in the second Gulf War, in comparison with its approach in the third Gulf War is an apt example.

¹⁸⁹ The 1994 White Paper states that a French reintegration into NATO is rejected. However, France identifies the U.S. as the current superpower and the NATO as “the principal organization of defense.” French defense ministers and chief of staffs join NATO meetings on a case-by-case basis. Janet Bryant, “Changing Circumstances, Changing Policies? The 1994 Defense White Paper and Beyond,” in *France from the Cold War to the New World Order*, eds. Tony Chafer and Brian Jenkins (New York: St. Martins Press, 1996) 84.

world policy, France can enlarge its scope. In sum, that is why France will continue to be interested in global acting and in a Europe that is as independent as possible. To achieve these goals, France must take three things into consideration. First, Europe needs more self-reliance; second, France's basic convictions must be adapted to European interests; and third, a further approach to the Atlantic Alliance. All these conditions are also in congruence with Germany's interests. Therefore, France seems to be well on its way to success.

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V. THE FUTURE OF NATO: IS NATO ADEQUATE TO THE TO THE CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY?

A. INTRODUCTION: TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS WITHIN THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

Is NATO adequate to the challenges of the twenty-first century? Or is NATO, optimized to the conditions of the Cold War, damned to irrelevance? The dispute about the future of NATO is as old as 1949. But under the threat of current global challenges such as “world-wide terrorism, proliferation of WMD, poverty and disease, AIDS, water scarcity, global warming or migratory movements with economic measures”¹⁹⁰ the debate about NATO’s relevance has become acrimonious. The terrorist attacks of September 11 and the resulting United States decision, despite the immediate invocation of Article 5 of the NATO charter, not to use NATO command structures in the war against terrorism, provoked discussions about the viability of the Alliance.¹⁹¹ One reason is, surely, that there are deep disagreements about the weight given to political versus military solutions in resolving such crises.¹⁹² As a consequence of the unipolar action of the United States, the Europeans have developed their own independent ESDP.

If NATO does indeed become an Alliance of opportunities for most Europeans, and a toolbox for the United States, then the best days of the Alliance are over, because, in its worldwide war against terrorism, the United States has decided to forgo the use of NATO. And European’s, in response, have developed their own defense structures and capabilities. This process once more broaches the question what future benefit or utility does this Alliance still possess?¹⁹³ In Chapter V., I will argue that NATO’s capacity to act militarily has always been proportionately equal to its member’s collective security policy, which has also served to justify NATO’s credibility. Helga Haftendorn stresses in

¹⁹⁰ The Council of the European Union, “A Secure Europe in a Better World - The European Security Strategy,” http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.ASP?id=266&lang=EN&mode=g 4. (accessed March 2, 2005).

¹⁹¹ Jean Paul Béchat and Felix G. Rohatyn, “The Future of the Transatlantic Defense Community” (Washington: The CSIS Press Center, 2003), 8.

¹⁹² Kristin Archick and Paul Gallis, “NATO and the European Union,” Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, January 2005, 2.

¹⁹³ Helga Haftendorn, “Das Atlantlantische Bündnis in der Anpassungskrise” (Berlin: SWP-Studie, 2005), 7.

her current study that “the members of NATO engage only then with their whole strength, when their own security interests are affected or when collective interests advise cooperation ... the lack of an external threat opens political solo efforts which would be very dangerous during the time of the East-west confrontation.”¹⁹⁴ From this, it follows that the main question to answer is whether or not NATO’s partners on both sides of the Atlantic are still willing to maintain a militarily capable North Atlantic Alliance. This chapter will focus the roles of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, because the differences in their positions within NATO are most significant.

B. PERSPECTIVES OF THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP

The structure of the American and the European society, with their inherent the principles of democracy, liberalism, and individual human rights represent the transatlantic cultural clip. This does not change the fact that life and perceptions differ significantly on both sides of the Atlantic.¹⁹⁵ Both Americans and Europeans feel obliged to live by the principles of democracy, liberty, equality, and a market economy, but their perceptions of how to deal with current and future global threats are presently different.

However, the building and adherence of alliances is of special importance because the described value community is unique in the world. This supports endeavors to ensure long-term reliability in building alliances.¹⁹⁶ While the United States has periodically published a security strategy and thus made its security interests public, the EU followed this example for the first time in December 2003, with the issuance of the European Security Strategy (ESS).¹⁹⁷

The security interests of the United States and the EU, as described in Chapter III, are in agreement. It is their declared aim to secure the Western value system against instability or threats from outside by “enlargement,” which is clearly identified as both a

¹⁹⁴ Helga Haftendorf, 28.

¹⁹⁵ Matthias Rüb. *Der Atlantische Graben: Amerika und Europa auf getrennten Wegen*, (Wien: Paul Zsolnay Verlag, 2004), 20.

¹⁹⁶ Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness,” *Policy Review*, no 113, June/July 2002, revised as *Of Paradise and Power* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2003) 121.

¹⁹⁷ The Council of the European Union, „A Secure Europe in a Better World - The European Security Strategy,” http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.ASP?id=266&lang=EN&mode=g (accessed March 28, 2005).

United States and a European security interest. One key difference in Europe is that states like those in the Baltic, Poland, and south-east Europe feel safer in NATO with United States than in the EU, where they attempt to protect their own interests by levying provisos against the leading French-German claims.¹⁹⁸

Despite their apparent agreement in terms of strategy, a significant debate exists between the United States and Europe as to the proper way to secure the Western value system against instability and threats from outside. This debate has become increasingly heated and more controversial. The European self-image is such that it places primacy on “civil power,” with war being seen more as a means of last resort. As such, the Europeans, main interest is to preserve the defensive character of NATO.¹⁹⁹

Nevertheless, as shown in Chapter IV, there are differing foreign-policy interests in Europe. Most significant is the French policy, dedicated to building up a European power that is able to balance the American hegemony. In contrast to France, Great Britain supports a transatlantic community that defines itself as in a “special relationship” with the United States. The role of “facilitator,” especially between France and United States, has, in past decades, been fulfilled by Germany. It impelled the unification and the reinforcement of the European Union but, at the same time, supported for the anchoring of the United States in Europe. Germany would benefit from maintaining this role, but, through its biased approach to the United States, the current German Socialist/Green government has discredited itself as a facilitator.²⁰⁰

The United States, acting as the “benevolent hegemon,” possesses by the ability to limit the hegemonic interests of individual European states and, therefore maintains the mechanism through which European unification was possible.²⁰¹ Nevertheless, since the 1999 Kosovo war, the more and more institutionalized security and defense policy (ESDP) of the European Union can also, be perceived as a challenge to the United States.²⁰²

¹⁹⁸ Helga Haftendorn, 7.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid, 11.

²⁰⁰ Ibid, 11.

²⁰¹ Robert Kagan and William Kristol, “The Present Danger,” *National Interest* 59 (Spring 2000), 58.

²⁰² Kristin Archick and Paul Gallis, 9.

The core of the U.S. security policy interest is the maintenance of its dominant position in the international system. In addition, the United States stresses the necessity and importance of an international regime and organizations and makes NATO, at least in its NSS, a top priority.²⁰³

In contrast, until the end of the twentieth century NATO's European alliance members possessed neither the will nor the capability to develop a security concept that surpassed Europe's borders. This fact and success of operation Allied Force against Yugoslavia in 1999 raised questions about NATO's capability to act militarily. The terrorist attacks of September 11 and the resulting United States decision not to use NATO command structures in the war against terrorism, despite the immediate invocation of NATO's Article 5, provoked discussions about the end of the Alliance. That was the general political climate in which the 2002 Prague summit took place.

1. The Prague Summit: Transformation of NATO

One of the main goals of the Prague summit of November 2002 was to discuss and facilitate the continued maintenance and enlargement of the Alliance. This topic had been removed after the meeting of NATO defense ministers in June of that year and the discussion of security interests after September 11, 2001.

During an informal meeting of the defense ministers on September 24th, 2002, in Warsaw, the United States defense minister proposed to build up a rapid reaction force, the NATO Response Force (NRF). The summit in Prague, which was planned as an "enlargement summit," changed its official character and was seen thereafter as a "Transformation summit" in terms of public perception.²⁰⁴ Therefore, members were officially given notice that NATO was in a transformation process, a continual process of adaptation and renewal.²⁰⁵

²⁰³ The White House, "National Security Strategy of the United States of America," <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss3.html> 5. (accessed April 3, 2005).

²⁰⁴ Karl-Heinz Kamp, "Die Bedeutung der zweiten NATO-Osterweiterung," in *Jahrbuch für Internationale Sicherheitspolitik 2003*, ed. Erich Reiter (Hamburg: Verlag E.S. Mittler, 2003), 410.

²⁰⁵ George Robertson, "Speech at the 39. Security Conference," *Europäische Sicherheit* 52, Nr. 3/2003, 28.

The impulse for the transformation of NATO required an updated threat analysis. The combat of worldwide terrorism moved into the center of consideration and led to the conclusion that the abilities of NATO had to be adjusted. NATO was oriented to the U.S. National Security Strategy, which stated a need for a worldwide deployable force.²⁰⁶

Before the planned invitation of new candidates Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia the Prague summit emphasized that “Effective military forces are an essential part of our overall strategy, are vital to safeguard the freedom and security of our populations and to contribute to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic region.”²⁰⁷ To achieve that, the NATO members decided to create a NATO reaction force, the NATO Response Force (NRF), to streamline the NATO command structure in Europe, and to improve and develop new capabilities for military warfare in a high-threat environment (Prague Capabilities Commitment).²⁰⁸

At the center of these decisions was the United States initiative for a NATO Response Force, which required a rehashing of NATO’s ability to act against terrorism, a mostly external threat. Thus, NATO’s capacity to act was seen quite differently than it had been during 1999 Washington summit, where NATO’s need to act was perceived as being bound by no geographical borders. Finally, all NATO member states affirmed that they were “determined to deter, disrupt, defend and protect, against any attacks on us in accordance with the Washington treaty and the Charter of the United Nations.”²⁰⁹ The influence of the U.S. National Security Strategy the declaration of the 2002 Prague summit is obvious.

2. Implementation of the Prague Summit Decisions

To answer the medium- and long-term future of the Prague summit decisions, it is necessary to investigate some short-term results of the summit. The plan for the building

²⁰⁶ The White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss3.html> (accessed March 3, 2005).

²⁰⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Prague Summit Declaration,” NATO Press Release, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm> (accessed April 14, 2005).

²⁰⁸ Kristin Archick and Paul Gallis, 3.

²⁰⁹ Prague Summit Declaration, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>, (accessed April 14, 2005).

of the NATO Response Force (NRF), the schedule and its adherence offers a first answer, if the nations really agree upon their declared aims to reform NATO. The NRF should consist of 21,000 soldiers for all the tasks of the NATO spectrum and, within a lead time of 5 to 30 days be deployable worldwide. The NRF should be ready for action as soon as possible, but no later than 2006.²¹⁰ Some European Alliance members were initially hesitant because they presumed a United States disturbance in reaction to the already decided European Crisis Reaction Forces under the Helsinki headline goal of the EU.²¹¹

However, the aim of the United States initiative was planned not only to levy a new contingent possessing special task capabilities as intervention troops, but also as a means to improve the military capabilities of NATO partner nations.²¹² The prospect of increasing the Alliance capability to act was what had first attracted its members. Many member states followed a strategy focused on niche capabilities and saving money.²¹³ At the same time, those developments raised questions. The relation between the NRF and the EU intervention force was, for those states, of special importance, because they were members of both NATO and the EU. The EU intervention force was primarily planned to fulfill the “Petersberg tasks” under the European headline goal.²¹⁴ Until the June 2003 NATO summit, there was congruity that the EU intervention force must be integrated into command structures which had yet to be created. In the case of a possible overlapping in the fields of the mission spectrum or force equivalents, the political tasks of the NRF and the EU forces can be seen as complementary: they complete one another. The EU acknowledged the necessity to carry out a verification and, if necessary, an

²¹⁰ Johannes Varwick, “Brauchen Europa und Amerikaner einander? Das Streben nach einer sicherheitspolitischen Autonomie der EU,” in *Jahrbuch für Internationale Sicherheitspolitik 2003*, ed. Erich Reiter (Hamburg: Verlag E.S. Mittler 2003), 399.

²¹¹ At the European Council meeting in Cologne and in Helsinki in December 1999, the challenging aim for the development of autonomous European military capabilities was decided (Helsinki Headline Goal). This decision comprised a 60,000 soldiers intervention force for crisis reaction, designed to carry out the full range of “Petersberg tasks,” rapidly deployable within 60 days, and sustainable for a year, with appropriate back-up rotation capability. Jean Paul Béchat and Felix G. Rohatyn, 6.

²¹² Carl W. Ek, “The NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitment,” Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, November 2003, 3.

²¹³ Ibid, 4.

²¹⁴ Jean Paul Béchat and Felix G. Rohatyn, 6.

updating of the Petersberg tasks, “but stopped short before expanding the Petersberg tasks.”²¹⁵ Not until the terrorist bombings in Madrid did EU leaders issue a new declaration on combating terrorism.²¹⁶

However, NATO and EU national forces were disposable only once the will of all participating nations was challenged to find a common solution: “but it was far from clear that all Europeans have accepted the high-intensity missions for which the United States military is being designed.”²¹⁷

With this background, on June 12th, 2003, the NATO defense ministers passed the political and military concept for the NRF: a “tiered readiness joint force; expeditionary in character and design, able to execute the full range of missions: peace to a high-intensity war fight.”²¹⁸ On July 16th, a “Force Generation Conference” for the first two readiness phases took place as the so-called NRF1 and NRF2. On October 13th, 2004, the NATO Secretary General formally announced that the NRF had reached its initial operational capability. The NRF is expected to reach its full operational capability by October 2006.²¹⁹

In fact, NATO was able to redeem the challenging schedule. NRF 1 was put into commission on October 1st, eleven months after the Prague summit. The European side provided all immediately available forces. The implicit function of the NRF to work as a “catalyst” for the transformation of the European forces was not sufficient. The Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) requested improvement of the military capabilities for

²¹⁵ Kristin Archick and Paul Gallis, 21.

²¹⁶ Ibid, 21.

²¹⁷ Ibid, 7.

²¹⁸ Unknown author, NATO Response Force – NATO’s Expeditionary Capability, Report at the Summit of the Defense Ministers in Colorado Springs in October 2003.
<http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2003/10-colorado/briefing02.pdf> (accessed April 15, 2005).

²¹⁹ Kristin Archick and Paul Gallis, 5.

modern operations.²²⁰ The first steps in that direction, made in 2003, got a bad write-up, in contrast to the structural building of the NRF.²²¹

In addition, it is necessary to make sure that the effectiveness of the elaborately compiled NRF intervention force is not restricted by national provisos and political-decision processes, which must be accommodated. This is valid for parliamentary procedures in the member states and for the mechanisms in the corresponding NATO caucus. Up to the present, all members have intended that the principle of unanimity of NATO would also be valid for NRF missions. The question as to the legitimacy of NRF missions also has to be clarified. NATO commander General James Jones was right when he stated that “in the future nations would have to consider whether the opposition of one or two nations could continually stymie the will of the majority.”²²²

The current development to achieve an effective contribution to the NRF and to allow its action in the case of emergency will be a decisive issue for the future of the Alliance.

3. The 2004 Istanbul Summit: A Summit of Discontent

With the decisions of the Prague summit, the Alliance seemed to have made great progress, not only in handling the terrorist challenge better than in the past, but also to reaching consent within NATO. The decision of the United States and Great Britain to intervene in Iraq, without a United Nation’s mandate, split the Transatlantic Alliance, as well as Europe in general.²²³ On the other hand, the United States was supported by no less than sixteen of the twenty-six NATO members, even though they provided that

²²⁰ Like the 1999 Washington summit, which launched the Defense Capability Initiative (DCI), the PCC is aimed at improving members` operational capabilities to address evolving defense needs. PCC is monitored by a group of representatives of NATO. But PCC is much more explicitly and narrowly drawn than DCI. It calls alliance, and nuclear defense; Intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition; Air to ground surveillance; members to make commitments concerning their military capabilities in eight specific areas: Chemical, biological, radiological Command, control, and communications; Combat effectiveness, including PGM`s and suppression of enemy air defenses; Strategic air and sea lift; Air to air refueling; and Deployable combat support and combat service support units. Carl W. Ek, 4.

²²¹ Carl W. Ek, 6.

²²² Michael Smith, New Force Will End Specter of French-Dominated Euro Army, November 22nd, 2002, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk>. (accessed February 20, 2005).

²²³ Helga Haftendorn, 8.

support with only a small number of forces.²²⁴ The Istanbul summit of June 2004 occurred at a time when the discontent in the Alliance about the United States invasion of Iraq was being discussed with great vehemence. It was hoped the conference would overcome the differences surrounding the Iraq question and bring the Alliance partners to coherence again.²²⁵

However, the European governments stressed that, even if military action is occasionally necessary, they largely prefer political measures to counter global threats.²²⁶ For the near future it would be difficult to persuade the European populations to join the United States in military operations.²²⁷ Nevertheless, the Istanbul summit communiqué invoked a full commitment to the collective defense of NATO member populations, territory, and forces. It stressed that “transatlantic cooperation is essential in defending our values and meeting common threats and challenges, from wherever they will come.”²²⁸ Despite all differences about the unilateral United States action against Iraq, all sides were still willing to continue to shape a global military capability within the North Atlantic Alliance. During the summit, members noted with satisfaction that one of the two initiatives to revitalize the alliance was on schedule: the NRF force would be fully operational by 2006.²²⁹ The PCC, however, with its eight capability goals, seemed to be a failure; only the Chemical/Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense battalion had become fully operational. There are still shortfalls also in the strategic airlift and aerial refuelers and those PCC goals are unlikely to be met on schedule.²³⁰

At NATO’s third military capability conference in November 2004, EU officials agreed to initiate the creation of thirteen battle groups. Each battle group would be built by two nations and would include non-EU members. One battle group was scheduled to

²²⁴ Paul Gallis, “The NATO Summit at Istanbul 2004,” Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, July 2004, 1.

²²⁵ Helga Haftendorn, 12.

²²⁶ Ibid, 6.

²²⁷ Ibid, 6.

²²⁸ Istanbul Summit Communiqué, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm> (accessed April 15, 2005).

²²⁹ Paul Gallis, 4.

²³⁰ Ibid, 4.

be ready for action by 2005 or 2006, and the deadline for all thirteen battle groups to be fully operational was set for 2007.²³¹ Unfortunately, members have yet to determine what the operative concept will be and where the most probable theaters for these new battle groups will be.²³²

4. The Future of the North Atlantic Alliance

Whether NATO fails or succeeds depends on whether or not a viable solution to the disputed differences within the transatlantic Alliance can be achieved. In its provision of adequate military capabilities, Europe has to fulfill United States expectations. In return, the United States must allow participation in solving security policy issues and accept, to some extent, the independence of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).²³³ The policy will be backed up by a military arm capable of managing a full spectrum of crisis-management tasks. It is conceivable that NATO states on both sides of the Atlantic may be unable to find a common satisfactory solution, leaving them incapable of acting in their collective interests. NATO would then cease to exist as a regional defense organization focused on Europe. As for the United States, such an instrument would allow them to continue to have influence on European political decisions. However, in the long term, the members of NATO would eventually ask the central question: How much are we willing to spend for an alliance whose only function is its ability to ensure stability transfer in Europe without the military capability to act? Furthermore, it is questionable how such an alliance would differentiate itself from other organizations in Europe. Especially as, with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), there is already an organization which deals with security policy issues in Europe and that has a transatlantic reach.²³⁴ NATO would be marginalized in Europe. This scenario however, is not probable.

Despite the problems the Europeans obviously have with the implementation of the “decision of transformation,” it is probable that they will continue to achieve the

²³¹ Kristin Archick and Paul Gallis, 20.

²³² Helga Haftendorn, 17.

²³³ Kristin Archick and Paul Gallis, 2.

²³⁴ Bruce George and John Borawski, “The OSCE, the NATO, and the European Security in the Twenty-First Century,” *ISIS Briefing Paper* No. 17, January 1998, 2.

specified results. With the creation of a European Security Strategy (ESS), Europe has shown its will to develop foreign and security policy concepts. While the language of the ESS is sometimes vague, all EU members can find their own interests in it. The ESS can be seen as a further milestone on the way to a serious European defense contribution as a second pillar within NATO.²³⁵ Reference to “preventive action” shows clearly the similarity between the ESS and the NSS. It will be the cornerstone of corresponding NATO missions.

That the necessity for more flexibility in military operations is recognized by European parliaments shows the Germany’s interest in “deployment law.”²³⁶ National parliamentary control will prevent precipitate military involvement and future actions that violate the common interests and values. In marked contrast to those circumstances, “national caveats” that impede operations have to be avoided. Governments that contribute forces to an allied mission must not impose restrictions on that tasks those forces may undertake.²³⁷

With the decision to build a European Defense Agency (EDA), Europe is undertaking an important step in the improvement of its collective military capability.²³⁸ By combining of interests Europe can take the important first steps toward transformation without increasing defense expenditures that can thus be used to build the necessary capabilities of the NRF-force.

²³⁵ Johannes Varwick, “Brauchen Europa und Amerikaner einander? Das Streben nach einer sicherheitspolitischen Autonomie der EU,” in *Jahrbuch für Internationale Sicherheitspolitik 2003*, ed. Erich Reiter. (Hamburg: Verlag E.S. Mittler, 2003), 400.

²³⁶ On December 3rd, 2004, the German Parliament passed, with the votes of the SPD and BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, the “deployment law” about the use of German armed forces in foreign countries. This law came into force on March 24th, 2005. Aktuelle Meldungen, Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz für Einsätze der Bundeswehr im Ausland, http://www.deutsches-wehrrecht.de/WR-AktuelleMeldungen_Text.html (accessed, April 15, 2005).

²³⁷ Kristin Archick, 7.

²³⁸ The European Defense Agency was established by the European Council on July 12, 2004. It is designed to support member states in their effort to improve defense capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the ESDP with the following four functions: First, defense capabilities development; second, armaments cooperation; third, the European defense technological and industrial base; and four, defense equipment market and research and technology. Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, appoints Eero Lavonen as Chair of EDA meetings of National Armaments Directors. The Council of the European Union, “The European Defense Agency” (Brussels: S067/05, 18 February 2005).

In the European Security Strategy and in the not-yet-ratified draft of the EU constitution, the importance attached to NATO and their right of access to the regulation of conflicts is stressed. With the installation of a European liaison cell among the NATO staff, the EU plans to coordinate with NATO, according to the Berlin Plus agreements.²³⁹ Therewith, the European Alliance partners demonstrate goodwill in response to U.S. worries regarding independent European security structures. In this area, several conflicts are preprogrammed because, with the takeover of more responsibilities as “European pillar in NATO” and with better military capabilities, the Europeans will develop more self-confidence.²⁴⁰ The initiation of a “new transatlantic dialogue” could restore the right balance to the Alliance again. In this dialogue one thing should be clear. The United States is able “to realize its security interest without NATO, but without the United States NATO has no continuance.”²⁴¹ The idea of balancing the United States with European Security and Defense Policy is neither realistic, nor useful.

However, with an appropriate takeover of responsibility by the European Allies, combined with cooperative behavior, the United States may come to European peculiarities at the end. The United States will, in the long term especially, because it cannot, for cultural reasons withhold rights that it claims for itself from an equivalent partner in a value-and-interest community like NATO.²⁴²

The United States interest in “burden sharing” shows that basic multilateral approaches will be pursued where the capabilities of the European allies promise easing of the burden. The examples of Afghanistan and Iraq show clearly that, after an extensive benefit-cost analysis, the United States has an interest in acting within the scope of NATO. Owing to today’s NATO military capabilities, such a benefit-cost analysis will probably not reveal itself until the post-conflict phase.²⁴³ This frustrating situation will

²³⁹ Helga Haftendorn, 20.

²⁴⁰ Johannes Varwick, “Brauchen Europa und Amerikaner einander? Das Streben nach einer sicherheitspolitischen Autonomie der EU;” in *Jahrbuch für Internationale Sicherheitspolitik 2003*, ed. Erich Reiter (Hamburg: Verlag E.S. Mittler, 2003), 401.

²⁴¹ Helga Haftendorn, 28.

²⁴² Ibid, 28.

²⁴³ Twenty month after the fall of the Taliban regime in Kabul, the U.S. provided less than 50% of the troops in Afghanistan; and in August 2003, NATO took command over the peace force. Heinrich Kreft, “Weltpolitik statt Geopolitik,” in: *Jahrbuch für Internationale Sicherheitspolitik 2003*, ed. Erich Reiter (Hamburg: Verlag E.S. Mittler, 2003), 454.

not end until the military capabilities of the European members of NATO are upgraded. The result may be “burden sharing” with equal rights and duties.

NATO, because of its orientation toward the U.S. National Security Strategy, is well on the way to developing global military capabilities. In public discussions in Europe, that policy aspect is noted and sometimes criticized as the NATO “World police” role. It is very important for the legitimacy of NATO in that respect to design transparent decision mechanisms for NATO missions. For Europeans especially, the United Nations (UN) is viewed as the strongest source of legitimacy. All NATO partners agree that a UN Security Council decision should be the basis for NATO to act. The experiences of the Iraq war since 2003 show that reforms of the UN are necessary to strengthen its legitimizing role for the future. The Kosovo war set a precedent, however, that in a special situation, NATO members decided to act without a UN mandate. It remains to be seen whether that case, will in retrospective be judged as a breach of international law or as a further development of international law; but the fact remains that sovereign states saw the necessity to act in response to the blatant violation of human rights, showing that organizations that are unable to resolve such problem situations may come under international pressure.

NATO may have to legitimize itself through its military capacity to act. If so, the NATO of the future will gain increased importance through its participation in an formation of military coalitions. Already today, the Alliance has the model framework for building “ad hoc alliances.” The Alliance of the future will have improved capabilities, in particular, in the form of NRF. Those will be, especially in the case of short-term missions, the first-choice forces. Long-term missions must to be supported by other forces: that opens the field to “ad hoc coalitions of the willing.” In addition, tailored forces must be trained for long-term missions in different locations. NATO-structures are the blueprint, therefore, that has to be followed by Alliance partners. It is not necessary for all partners to participate in a mission. Already the NATO treaty from 1955 allows member states, in the case of collective defense, to provide the means they consider necessary. Besides the member states, non member states can also be admitted, given the option of adding “ad-hoc” forces. The feared reduction of NATO to a toolbox of the

United States can be prevented by these mechanisms and changed to an effective concept.²⁴⁴ Eventually, these kinds of efficient instruments, like the NRF, will increase NATO's strength, confidence, and capacity to act.

The tendency to bring NATO into the worldwide mission before the completion of the transformation measures shows the future direction that the Alliance must go. Surely the Alliance will have to deal with differences in the future, but at least in mid-term there is no replacement for NATO.

C. CONCLUSION

The credibility of NATO has depended since its foundation on its political and military capability to act. Historically, relations between the United States and its European Alliance partners have been anything but excellent. At the same time, NATO has faced and survived many internal crises, such as France's 1966 withdrawal from the alliance's integrated military structure. Both questions how to respond to the Soviet aggression against Afghanistan (1980), and the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe (early 1980s) temporarily intensified tensions within the transatlantic relationship. After the end of the Cold War, the terrorist attacks of September 11 and the resulting United States decision, despite the immediate invocation of Article 5, not to use NATO command structures in the war against terrorism, once again provoked discussions about the nature of the alliance.

NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history, but during the war in Afghanistan the United States relied mainly on its own capabilities. Only a few units of special forces from chosen countries were accepted to support the United States in this war. One reason for the decision was that the Allies lacked the military capabilities to maintain a speedy war with minimum civilian and military casualties. Another reason was surely the lack of NATO interoperability.²⁴⁵

²⁴⁴ Helga Haftendorn, 20.

²⁴⁵ Most NATO-member countries lack the following military capabilities: airborne refueling, air transport, precision-guided munitions, and night-vision equipment. Carl W. Ek, "The NATO's Prague Capabilities Commitment," Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, November 2005, 3.

However, EU and U.S. cultural commonalities, security interests, of the United States and the EU and decades-old institutional experiences with NATO ultimately drove the Alliance partners to transform NATO into an organization with a military capacity to act globally. To achieve implementation of that great plan, the common was not enough. NATO is now involved in a context that continuing process of coordination in which political disputes can only be expected. It was within that context that the NATO Secretary General, his November 2004 speech, called for the development of a “dispute culture” inside NATO. “Only an alliance which does not evade critical questions and does not eschew the dispute can play a political role.”²⁴⁶

The desired flexibility will invariably reinforce the transformation process. Ad hoc coalitions and coalitions of the willing will come into existence in and through NATO and NATO will bind them institutionally. A sufficient military capability to act worldwide will distinguish NATO from similar organizations and reconstitute the attractiveness of the Alliance. A change to a politically more inward organization focussed on Europe, like the OSCE, can be precluded. It is in Germany’s vital interests that NATO continue to be the leading military organization in the world, that goes into action if military engagement is necessary beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. The European Defense and Security policy will focus on stabilization and reconstruction missions within the Petersberg tasks in Europe.

²⁴⁶ Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, “Die Zukunft der transatlantischen Sicherheitspartnerschaft,” (Berlin: Welt am Sonntag Forum, November 8, 2004), 6.

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VI. CONCLUSION

A. INTRODUCTION: A WORLD WITHOUT THREATS

Two specific occurrences have decisively modified the international security landscape: the end of the Cold War period and the dramatic increase and volume of threat of international terrorism. The terrorist attacks of September 11 caused a paradigm change in American foreign and security policies. In the twentieth century United States security was dependent on the prevention of the occupation by a European power of the Eurasian area. This was accomplished with the breakdown of the Soviet Union. Since then, the United States has no important rival. After 9/11 U.S. foreign and security policies turned logically toward weak and rogue states that support terrorism coining a philosophy of “regime change.” The United States had finally answered on the stage of twenty-first century world politics.

In contrast, since 1991, and despite spates of international terrorism, the security situation has been better in Europe than it was during the Cold War period. Though some interstate conflicts continue in various countries, there is also a broad general belief that disputes can be solved by peaceful means.

This thesis attempts to determine whether the presence or absence of external threats will be the main determinant whether or not Europe and the United States continue to cooperate in security alliances. The European Security Strategy shows that there are serious security issues threatening Europe that are different than the classical ones. Significantly the invocation of Article 5 of the NATO treaty in the aftermath of September 11 was not sufficient to gather the Western nations behind United States leadership in the same way that the Cold War confrontation between the two nuclear superpowers had done. The United States decision, despite the immediate invocation of Article 5, not to use NATO command structures in the war against terrorism, provoked alarming discussions about the continued viability of the Alliance.²⁴⁷ Alliances such as NATO, which were established in response to imminent security threats, not economic,

²⁴⁷ Jean Paul Béchat and Felix G. Rohatyn, *The Future of the Transatlantic Defense Community* (Washington: The CSIS Press Center, 2003), 8.

environmental or human-rights issues, had therefore to address a central question: where they still necessary or were there other, perhaps better, options for addressing the newly emerging threat of non-nation, clandestine terrorist groups such as al Qaeda.

With the breakdown of the Warsaw Pact and the liberation of the Soviet Union satellite states, numerous east European countries have applied for membership in NATO. Those countries independent of their membership in the EU, feel safer and more protected from the United States dominance in NATO, than through a European Union dominated by France and Germany. So NATO, the EU, and other organizations are now forced to struggle with the competitive interests of their members. The question remaining is: what motivates the United States to maintain its membership in NATO?

First, alliances can be catalysts providing the United States with opportunities to exercise its superior influence through collective bargaining and monetary negotiations. Membership in NATO permits burden-sharing in maintaining world order. The increase in burden-sharing has led to a shifting of burdens, which has directly inspired European deliberations to create their own independent European Security and Defense Policies, regardless of whether or not the United States still views itself as a European leader. The European Security and Defense Policy was feared at all times as an idea “undermining the alliances` integrated military structure.”²⁴⁸ It was possible for the United States to persuade its allies, before the signing of the Maastricht Treaty (1991), to endorse the Rome declaration (1991). That confirmed that NATO “is the essential forum for consultation and the locus of decision for agreements regarding the security commitments of the allies arising out of the North Atlantic Treaty.”²⁴⁹ Since the experience of the Kosovo campaign (1999), there is no way to stop the emerging ESDP.

For the United States international stability is the most important issue, because it ensures the continued maintenance of trade relations and prevents the emergence of second superpower. But France is able to substantiate itself as a world power by acting collectively with its European neighbors. And because France needs a European-power

²⁴⁸ Christina Balis, v., and Simon Servaty, eds., *Visions of America and Europe: September 11, Iraq, and the Transatlantic Relations*. (Washington D.C.: CSIS Press, 2004), 29.

²⁴⁹ Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, Press Communiqué S-1 (91) 86 (Brussels: NATO Press Service, November 8, 1991), in: Christina Balis, v., and Simon Servaty, eds., 29.

base to facilitate its world-power role, it can achieve this aim only if American hegemony is diluted back in Europe. The United States, not surprisingly, view France's intention to balance the United States as completely inappropriate. That is why "some United States observers characterize France as antagonist."²⁵⁰ Apparently, what the United States actually wants is to discourage any and all large industrial nations from challenging its leadership and the current political and economic world order.²⁵¹ One question remains through: How can Europe, in the long run, succeed in providing its own security and still maintain and support its interests in the global community if the United States pulls out of Europe, especially in instances requiring military intervention?

B. MULTILATERALISM VERSUS UNILATERALISM

Marc Trachtenberg argues that the current United States administration is no more unilateralist, in fundamentally, than American administrations have been in the past. To the contrary, he stresses the example of the Kennedy administration, which put great pressure on the German government in 1963 to vote against German chancellor Konrad Adenauer and, eventually succeed in forcing him out of office.²⁵² The Cuban missile crisis, another example, would certainly have resulted in a third World War had the Soviets not relented. After all the threat posed by the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba was no greater for the United States than that posed by United States missiles in Turkey aimed at the Soviet Union.

However, the Wilsonian tradition of foreign policy tried to pursue a policy through institutions at the regional and the international level (e.g. League of Nations, United Nations). The current United States administration is pushing for the American vision of democracy and sees states as the key actors. Like stressed in the National Security Strategy stability will come from democratic states that act peacefully with each other. Values and norms anchored in the international institutions and law are perceived

²⁵⁰ Paul Gallis, "France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and Issues in the U.S.-French Relations," Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, February 4, 2005, 2.

²⁵¹ Patrick Tyler, U.S. Strategy Plans for Insuring No Rivals Develop A One-Superpower World, "New York Times," March 8, 1992, final edition.

²⁵² Eckart Conze, *Die gaullistische Herausforderung: Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen in der amerikanischen Europapolitik 1958-1963* (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1995), 291.

as less capable to solve future international problems. In marked contrast to this approach the European Security Strategy which is unequivocal in its commitment to the United Nations charter. The European priority is to strengthen this institution and support it with all necessary means at its disposal. The aim is “an international order based on effective multilateralism.”

Since the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the successions of weak Russian state, many Europeans feel they no longer need the United States as much as they once did.“ Europeans no longer think in Cold War political terms.”²⁵³ Trachtenberg explains the difference this way that with the lack of a unifying external threat the threat of a Soviet–U.S. nuclear war Europeans are much more willing to oppose the United States when they do not agree with U.S. policies and behavior.²⁵⁴ In addition, France is attempting to extend its own influence at the expense of Europe as a whole. Through its influence and control over European foreign and security policies, France exercises de-facto leadership in Europe. As a “European pole of defense” in world politics, France can enlarge its scope. France continues to be interested in global acting and, therefore, has a self-serving political need to keep Europe as independent as possible. To reclaim their previously diminished role in the international system, France tries to balance American “hyper-power” through the European Union, regardless of whether such actions are in the best interests of Germany or France’s other European neighbors. Insisting on the equality of the EU and the transatlantic Alliance, German foreign policy is anchored in both worlds, secure from both. The creation of strong military competition between the EU and United States in any form would only serve to further marginalize the European Union and cause an internal division of force. The idea of balancing the “Hegemon” is not only counterproductive, but also unrealistic for Europe. In addition it would support to endorse the political necessity in unilateral United States foreign policies.

²⁵³ Marc Trachtenberg, “The Future of the Western Alliance: An Historian’s View,” In: *A Constructed Peace: Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999. 401.

²⁵⁴ Ibid, 402.

C. TRANSATLANTICISM VERSUS INDEPENDENCE

France's and Germany's refusal to support the United States in the Iraq war has decisively weakened NATO. As Elisabeth Pond shows, "the alliances uninstitutionalized core of trust has been violated. That may be the hardest to restore."²⁵⁵ Thus a new basis for the transatlantic relations must be found before the continued drift becomes separation. The EU is well advised to seek for an shoulder to shoulder stance with the United States and at the same time to develop its own potential of a foreign, security, and defense policy.

The first steps are taken. The European Security Strategy goes much further than any European statement in accepting the United States post-9/11 threat assessment. The interaction between terrorist groups, proliferation of WMD, failed states, and organized crime are identified as the main dangers in both the ESS and the U.S. Security Strategy. Both documents also allow for preventive action in extraordinary cases, also there is no mention of "preemption" in the ESS. With continuing progress, the EU's with its ESDP will increasingly become the primary security institution for Europe and the role Europeans shape for themselves on the world stage will most likely be projected through it. During his 2005 visit to the EU institutions in Brussels, President Bush stressed that "the United States wants the European project to succeed" and that a "strong Europe" is in the United States interest.²⁵⁶

However, if the emergence of China and India two new global actors, should transform the geopolitical world landscape, we will need new ideas and responses to address our global security needs. The world economy is projected to be about 80 percent larger in 2020.²⁵⁷ The accompanying demand for energy, raw materials, and water will increase rapidly, and economic competition will greatly accelerate. The European Union and the United States must take an active interest in securing and maintaining access to

²⁵⁵ Elisabeth Pond, *Friendly Fire: The Near-Death of the Atlantic Alliance*, European Studies Organization, (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 89.

²⁵⁶ Kristin Archick, "The European Union in 2005 and Beyond," Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, March 7, 2005, 6.

²⁵⁷ Herfried Münkler, "Kriege im 21. Jahrhundert," in: *Jahrbuch für Internationale Sicherheitspolitik 2003*, ed. Erich Reiter (Hamburg: Verlag E.S. Mittler, 2003), 91.

those essential resources even through military means if and when necessary.²⁵⁸ This is provides yet another reason why, in the long run, the EU will be dependent on NATO. Furthermore, it is not acceptable that fundamental religious dictatorships control the world's oil resources or support terrorists, or that countries are able to extort the Western world with Weapons of Mass Destruction. The EU will be chastened by these needs.

The key to future global security will be determined by the ability of nations to act together when necessary, through the will to act cannot be forced, the progress the EU has made since the Treaty of Maastricht is remarkable and cannot be dismissed. The whole project, however, is still in an embryonic state, as was demonstrated by the EU's almost complete inability to react in common to the 2004 tsunami catastrophe in Asia. It is high time that Europe get its act together. As is argued here and elsewhere, the EU needs to develop capable joint rapid-response forces and effective means of military transportation and communication. The forces should be trained to operate in international environments and be able to cooperate multilaterally. The EU will remain dependent on NATO to act outside of Europe. European total independence in terms of security is unusual.

D. INTEGRATION VERSUS SOVEREIGNTY

Europe's integration of sovereign states who voluntarily relinquish sovereignty into a political union in a global world is a challenging and historically unique project. Europe's collective experience has coalesced into a cognition that single nations are too small to find the right answers to collective questions of vital importance and that Europe's future in a globalized world lies in the deepening of regional cooperation and integration. However, the EU will continue to run well as long as the economical uplift is guaranteed. Germany is the main monetary contributor to the European Union. Europe's appeal, especially for east European countries, but also for Turkey and others, is its economical success. Economical progress is the main reason countries want to join; long-term economical failure would be poison for the EU. If, in the long run, countries no longer have that economical advantage, as would be the case if Germany were unable to

²⁵⁸ Andreas Rinke, "Struck: Europäer müssen Zufuhr von Rohstoffen sichern," *Handelsblatt*, Nov 10, 2004, final edition.

continue as the main contributor of EU-payments, the EU could break apart.²⁵⁹ Who then would guarantee European security? Germany is well advised to continue beneficial transatlantic relations while, at the same time seeking deeper European integration. In contrast, it is inadvisable for Germany to commit itself to unstable alliances like Peking, Moscow, Berlin, and Paris axis against the 2003 Gulf war.

The Euro-Atlantic community must be seen in front of this background under the new global circumstances onto a regenerated and more stable basis. Worldwide cannot be solved without the United States and, therefore, it is high time to start a new transatlantic dialogue to explore solutions for our mutual future security.

E. CONCLUSION

My investigation demonstrates that the character and behavior of Western alliances, as exhibited by NATO, are such that a close relationship exists between the presence of a credible threat and the collective capacity to act as a cohesive alliance. I argue that in any given time period, the absence or presence of an overarching threat will dictate how Western alliances function. Indeed, in times of crisis, the transatlantic allies have demonstrated an ability to close ranks, end discussions, and act for the greater good. That is why NATO was so successful for nearly fifty years. It is noteworthy that NATO's long-term goal as an expression of transatlantic relations is not the preservation of its Cold War form and function, but the elimination of interstate war in Europe. Enlargement will help to achieve this.²⁶⁰

The United States self-confidence in dealing with power is not new, but its definition United States definition of international order is. Europe strongly desires a mutually beneficial working relationship with America. But the U.S. government has yet to initiate a dialogue with Europe, dismantling the U.S. unilateral image in order to support NATO efforts to adjust to current threats. The United States, as the lead nation in NATO, must bear the main burden in establishing and maintaining a strong and united

²⁵⁹ Franco Algieri, Janis A. Emmanouilidis, Roman Maruhn. "Europa differenziert denken: Fünf Szenarien zur Zukunft der Europäischen Union," in: *Jahrbuch für Internationale Sicherheitspolitik 2003*, ed. Erich Reiter (Hamburg: Verlag E.S. Mittler, 2003), 200.

²⁶⁰ Ivo Daalder and James M. Goldgeier, "Putting Europe First," International Institute for Strategic Studies (Washington D.C.: Brookings, 2000), 81.

West. It has the same values and faces the same threats as Europe in a globalized world, and most European nations are willing to maintain the approved partnership. An outright NATO divorce would seriously damage both sides over the long run.²⁶¹ But while the United States establishment needs to refine its diplomatic skills, Europe desperately needs to address its military concerns. As Robert Kagan asserts has argued Europe's military weakness is integral to the "European interest in inhabiting a world where military strength does not matter, where international law and international institutions predominate."²⁶² As a matter of principle, this view is not wrong: what is perceived by the United States as weakness is, for many Europeans, the main political vision of attainment for the twenty-first century.

The European undertaking to spend defense expenditures more wisely has failed to materialize in a substantial way,²⁶³ and closing the capability gap remains a key source of contention. The European Security Strategy and global-reach capability are important steps toward demonstrating that Europe recognizes the necessity for action. The EU must begin to close the transatlantic capability gap that exists between their forces. A renewal of the "EU Headline Goal 2010" and the development of small spearhead forces like the EU Rapid Reaction Forces²⁶⁴ are currently the best military options for Europe. They allow for an increased capability and interoperability while keeping costs to a minimum.

In sum, the question now is: how can the transatlantic Alliance overcome this crisis? One answer is, through a political unification of Europe that also prevents uncontrollable able geopolitical overstretching. Second, the vigor inside the European Union must be focused and concentrated. A political organization of common interests must be found that avoids an environment in which countries would hardly ever act together. Outside interference, from either the United States or Russia has to be

²⁶¹ Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, "American Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Relations," in *Shift or Rift: Assessing US-EU Relations after Iraq*, ed. Gustav Lindstrom (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, European Union, 2003), 102.

²⁶² Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness, Policy Review," June 2002. Also see Robert Kagan, "Of Paradise and Power," Alfred A. Knopf Publishers, 2003.

²⁶³ Kristin Archick, "The United States and Europe: Possible Options for U.S. Policy," Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, December 2004, 8.

²⁶⁴ In 2004, the EU agreed to enhance its rapid reaction capabilities by creating 13 battle groups (1500 soldiers each) able to deploy to trouble spots, especially in Africa, within 15 days, fully operational until 2007. Kristin Archick, 5.

minimized. Third, contrary to the self-motivated balance of power desired by France, Europe must cooperate with the United States as autonomous partner in NATO (though never fully equal), the United Nations, and the World Trade Organization. Finally, a new transatlantic dialogue with United States leadership, embedded in the international rule of law, has to begin with NATO as the primary locus of strategic consultation and coordination between the transatlantic partners.

The rifts within Europe-United States transatlantic relations have been growing for some time, but none the less, the transatlantic relations will remain, even without an external threat, the main neural cord of European security. The Western world must reunite and renew its purpose in order to deal with the new threats of terrorism and the perils of globalization. The survival of the west depends on it.

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